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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ORIGINALISM AND THE SENSE–REFERENCE DISTINCTION

CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN*

ABSTRACT
I deploy the sense–reference distinction and its kin from the philosophy of
language to answer the question of what in constitutional interpretation
should, and should not, be able to change after founders adopt a constitutional
provision. I suggest that a constitutional expression’s reference, but not its
sense, can change. Interpreters should thus give founders’ assessments of
reference only Skidmore-level deference. From this position, I criticize the
theories of constitutional interpretation offered by Raoul Berger, Jed
Rubenfeld, and Richard Fallon, and apply the theory to whether the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids racial segregation in public schools.
I. INTRODUCTION
Twice this past spring, disputes broke out among members of the Supreme
Court about whether the Constitution changes. In his dissents in Roper v.
Simmons1 and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,2 Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, sets out a vision of an
unchanging Constitution. In both episodes, Justices Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, opposes the originalist trio’s efforts on behalf of a living, changing
Constitution. These disputes reveal the Justices’ failure to appreciate certain
distinctions from the philosophy of language. Were these distinctions more
clearly understood, a neglected middle ground would emerge for those who
desire both to obey the historic, unchanging meaning conveyed in
constitutional language and to take proper account of facts that have changed
since the founding, or which the founders may have misperceived. The
philosophy of language can thus uncover an attractive yet neglected position

* Ph.D. candidate, philosophy, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1998, Yale Law School.
The author wishes to thank Bruce Ackerman, Larry Alexander, Paddy Blanchette, Jeff
Goldsworthy, Bonnie Green, Ray Hain, Lynn Joy, Matt Kennedy, Andy Koppelman, Alasdair
McIntyre, Luther Munford, Stephen Sachs, David Solomon, David Thunder, and participants in
discussions at the University of Notre Dame and University of Texas at Austin.
1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2. 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005).
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and offer the prospect of closure to a debate that seems interminable. Indeed,
these distinctions are urgently needed in order to rescue the Court from
continued confusion over the relevance of historical materials in cases like
Roper and McCreary County, or indeed in any case involving basic
interpretive controversy.
In the juvenile death penalty case, Roper, Scalia ridicules the Court for
suggesting that constitutional outcomes can properly change: “What a mockery
today’s opinion makes of Hamilton’s expectation [that the judiciary would be
‘bound down by strict rules and precedents’], announcing the Court’s
conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15
years—not, mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but
that the Constitution has changed.”3 Later, he says, “In a system based upon
constitutional and statutory text democratically adopted, the concept of ‘law’
ordinarily signifies that particular words have a fixed meaning. Such law does
not change . . . .”4 A footnote disparages cases that have given “brave new
meaning” to constitutional provisions.5 Scalia thereby suggests that any
change in constitutional outcomes amounts to a change in the meaning of
constitutional language.6
In response, Justice Stevens’s concurrence, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
suggests that even the meaning of the Constitution can change. He denies that
“the meaning of [the Eighth] Amendment [was] frozen when it was originally
drafted,”7 and claims that the Framers would agree that “our understanding of
the Constitution does change from time to time.”8 However, Stevens does not
3. 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 629.
5. Id. at 627 n.9 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–73 (2003); United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 847–50 (1992)).
6. I should issue a caveat here about Justice Scalia’s views. In his Roper and McCreary
County dissents, Justice Scalia suggests that originalism forbids any change in constitutional
outcomes. But elsewhere, he claims that changing constitutional outcomes are not a problem for
the originalist if a provision, like the Fourth Amendment, refers to a separate changing body of
law. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1540 (2006) (“Justice STEVENS’
attempted critique of originalism confuses the original import of the Fourth Amendment with the
background sources of law to which the Amendment, on its original meaning, referred. . . .
[C]hanges in the law of property to which the Fourth Amendment referred would not alter the
Amendment’s meaning . . . . There is nothing new or surprising in the proposition that our
unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies of law that might themselves change.”). I do not
attempt here to give a comprehensive or systematic account of Scalia’s views, but simply set out
his views as he states them in his Roper and McCreary County dissents. To the extent that Justice
Scalia allows for changing constitutional outcomes, his commitment in Roper to a fully
unchanging constitutional law and his unqualified allegiance in McCreary County to the Framers’
views regarding constitutional outcomes would need to be tempered or further explained.
7. Id. at 587 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring).
8. Id.
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give any indication of how we might know when one of those times might be
here again, explaining only that “the pace of that evolution is a matter for
continuing debate.”9 Indeed, Stevens not only leaves the pace of constitutional
evolution unclear and unmotivated, but also its direction: he exhibits no
principle to explain either where to go with the Constitution or how fast.
In his dissent in the Kentucky Ten Commandments case, McCreary
County v. ACLU of Kentucky, Justice Scalia, with the same allies, again
suggests that in order to maintain a stable constitutional meaning, we must
adhere to the Founders’ practices:
It is no answer for Justice STEVENS to say that the understanding that
these official and quasi-official actions reflect was not “enshrined in the
Constitution’s text.”
The Establishment Clause, upon which Justice
STEVENS would rely, was enshrined in the Constitution’s text, and these
official actions show what it meant. . . . What is more probative of the meaning
of the Establishment Clause than the actions of the very Congress that
proposed it, and of the first President charged with observing it?10

The Founders’ actions, for Scalia, are the best possible evidence of the
meaning of their language. He considers the Framers’ actions alone, and thus
neglects any possibility that an explanation from the Framers of why their
actions were consistent with their language might shed better light on the text’s
meaning.
In response, Justice Stevens, joined again by Justice Ginsburg, again
denies that the Constitution’s meaning is stable. Responding to Scalia’s
dissent in his own dissent in the Texas Ten Commandments case, Van Orden v.
Perry,11 Stevens says,
It is our duty . . . to interpret the First Amendment’s command that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” not by
merely asking what those words meant to observers at the time of the
founding, but instead by deriving from the Clause’s text and history the broad
principles that remain valid today.12

Stevens then cites racial school segregation, sex discrimination, and his
concurrence in Roper as cases in which the Court properly departed from the
original history of the Constitution.13 He then says, “We serve our
constitutional mandate by expounding the meaning of constitutional provisions

9. Roper, 543 U.S. at 587.
10. 125 S. Ct. at 2754–55 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting)
(internal citation omitted).
11. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
12. Id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. Id. (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Roper, 534 U.S. at 551–607 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
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with one eye towards our Nation’s history and the other fixed on its democratic
aspirations.”14 However, as in Roper, Stevens sets out no criterion for when
the original history should be defeated by “democratic aspirations.”
Justices Scalia and Stevens construct arguments with a critical implicit
common premise. In effect, Scalia reasons this way:
(1)

Constitutional outcomes properly change only if constitutional
meaning properly changes;

(2)

Constitutional meaning cannot properly change; therefore

(3)

Constitutional outcomes cannot properly change.

Preferring modus ponens to Scalia’s modus tollens, Stevens agrees with (1),
but instead implicitly reasons
(1)

Constitutional outcomes properly change only if constitutional
meaning properly changes; but

(~3) Constitutional outcomes can properly change; therefore
(~2) Constitutional meaning can properly change.
However, the shared premise (1) is false. Distinguishing sense from reference
reveals that changing constitutional outcomes can coexist with stability in
constitutional meaning. Correcting this mistake, embraced by a majority of the
Court in Roper, McCreary, and Van Orden, lies at the beginning of sound
thinking about how to interpret the Constitution.
While five of the Justices took sides in the Scalia/Stevens fray, the other
four—O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer—did not.15 Neither, however,
did they offer any competing middle ground. I want to offer such middle
ground here. This is ground sadly neglected in the long-running debate of
which Stevens’s and Scalia’s disputes this spring were a part. Jonah Goldberg
summarized the public debate last year: “A ‘living’ Constitution grows and
changes with the times. Generally speaking, liberals want a living Constitution
and conservatives don’t . . . . [O]f course, I want a dead Constitution.”16 In
14. Id. at 2889.
15. In Roper, however, Justice O’Connor did seem to cite Stevens’s concurrence favorably.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer sets out his views on
interpretation in his just-released 2005 book Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic
Constitution, which includes an extensive discussion and criticism of originalism, or “literalism,”
as he puts it, but he does not mention the Scalia/Stevens disputes in Roper and McCreary/Van
Orden directly.
16. Jonah Goldberg, It’s Alive! Why the Constitution Should Remain Dead, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE, July 8, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg070803.asp. For more
typical statements on whether the Constitution changes, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 21–22 (2d ed. 1997)
(“[A]ntiactivists (originalists) maintain that judges are not authorized to revise the Constitution
and that it is to be construed in light of the Founders’ explanations of what they meant to
accomplish, no more, no less.” (footnote omitted)); Raoul Berger, Some Reflections On
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contrast both to Goldberg and his opponents, I think that we have a partially
living and partially dead Constitution.
In this Article I explain how distinctions of long standing in the philosophy
of language can present a compelling distinction between which of the
Constitution’s attributes change and which do not. Judges and lawyers who
ignore the progress that philosophers have made in understanding how
language works will only find themselves repeating old mistakes and
maintaining old confusions. The Justices’ failures to appreciate the difference
between the meaning historically expressed by constitutional language, on the
one hand, and the tangible outcomes accomplished by that language, on the
other, lead to a frustrating dynamic. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg and their
allies insist rightly that the Constitution must take account of our changing
world, but they have no generally agreed-upon theory for why or when these
changing facts should matter for constitutional outcomes. On the other hand,
Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist and their allies insist
rightly that to accomplish its job the Constitution must remain stable, but they
frequently remain blind to the possibility that outdated facts, or factual
mistakes, may have underlain the Founders’ conclusions about constitutional
outcomes. The theory I present will make clear how we can get the best of
both views. We can make a precise accounting of the relevance of factual
change to change in constitutional outcomes, while still preserving a stable
anchor of constitutional meaning which, combined with the facts, produces
those outcomes. My view thus meets both a theoretical need—resolving this
long-standing dispute over the extent to which the Constitution is alive and
changing—and a practical need to determine exactly what sorts of historical
Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) [hereinafter Berger, Reflections]
(“[Interpretivism] conceives the judicial role as interpreting, not revising, the Constitution.”);
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40 (Amy
Guttman ed., 1997) (“It certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally suggests
changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in
such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.”); Stephen Reinhardt &
Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Feb. 2, 2004, http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2004_02_
01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html (Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit recently
describing himself as one of those “judges who treat[s] the Constitution as a living, breathing
instrument”); Goldberg, supra (quoting Al Gore: “I would look for justices of the Supreme Court
who understand that our Constitution is a living and breathing document, that it was intended by
our Founders to be interpreted in the light of the constantly evolving experience of the American
people.”); Joseph Sobran, Does the Constitution “Grow”?, SOBRAN’S, Oct. 5, 2000,
http://www.sobran.com/columns/1999-2001/001005.shtml (“The Constitution didn’t ‘grow’; it
was never supposed to. Written law must be stable, or it isn’t law. A government that can
change the very meaning of old words is tyrannical.”); Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and
Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 285 (1995) (“Those who argue
on behalf of originalism are not inclined to intone the virtues of . . . adaptability [or]
flexibility . . . .”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

560

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:555

evidence should constrain courts deciding cases like Roper, McCreary County,
or Van Orden.
The simple question whether or not the Constitution changes—whether it
is living or dead—is not well posed without refinement. No reasonable
theorist will contend either (a) that everything about the Constitution—
everything relevant for constitutional law—is fixed at the time of the framing,
or (b) that none of the Constitution’s legally relevant attributes are fixed at the
framing. If we define originalism in a strong way, as requiring that nothing
about the Constitution change, no one will be an originalist. But if we define it
weakly, as saying merely that some things about the Constitution stay the
same, everyone will be an originalist.
Instead of mooting such a coarse-grained question as whether everything
or nothing changes about the Constitution, and arguing about which represents
the real definition of originalism, those interested in originalism should ask
what particular aspects of the Constitution legitimately change and which do
not. Answers to these questions will be important, whether they amount to an
affirmation of originalism, or a departure from it. I will here defend an answer
based on Frege’s sense–reference distinction:17 the sense of a constitutional
expression is fixed at the time of the framing, but the reference is not, because
it depends on the facts about the world, which can change. At the risk of
indulging in a pun that may grow tiresome, I call my theory the Theory of
Original Sinn, after Frege’s word for sense, Sinn.
Were the Theory of Original Sinn accepted, Justices Stevens and Scalia
would not be debating the broad question whether the meaning of the
Constitution can ever change, but instead whether or not the framers were right
about the specific reference-yielding facts. While the meaning and sense of the
constitutional language are, as Justice Scalia insists, fixed, the reference of that
language depends on particular facts that the framers might have
misunderstood or that may have changed. Unfortunately, none of the Justices
addressed this precise question in Roper, McCreary County, or Van Orden.
While the framers are fallible regarding the reference of their constitutional
language, they are still extremely useful guides. As I explain later, under the
Theory of Original Sinn, framers’ assessments of reference would receive the
deference described in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. The framers’ assessments of
reference,
while not controlling upon [later interpreters of the Constitution] by reason of
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which [later interpreters] may properly resort for guidance. The weight of
such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident

17. See Gottlob Frege, Über Sinn und Bedeutung, 100 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND
PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK 25 (1892), translated in 57 PHIL. REV. 209 (1948) [hereinafter Frege,
Sense and Reference].
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in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.18

The quality of the Framers’ rationales for thinking that the Establishment
Clause allows non-coercive governmental endorsements of monotheism, or for
thinking that the Eighth Amendment allows the death penalty for 17 year olds,
is critical. If errors or obsolete facts were involved, their conclusions on these
issues alone are not interpretively controlling. The Theory of Original Sinn
therefore points to a more searching examination of the Framers’ thinking than
other forms of originalism would require.
Besides sense and reference, I will deploy two kindred distinctions to
present my theory: John Stuart Mill’s distinction between connotation and
denotation19 and Rudolph Carnap’s distinction between intensions and
extensions.20 These distinctions, particularly the distinction between intension
and extension, may differ slightly from the sense–reference distinction, but
only in matters of detail not immediately relevant for my use of the distinctions
for constitutional theory. The Theory of Original Sinn could equivalently be
explained as holding to a fixed constitutional connotation, but evolving
constitutional denotation, or as holding to a fixed constitutional intension, but
evolving constitutional extension.
While a full defense of the use of these distinctions to analyze the
Constitution would involve a full defense of the philosophical viability of the
distinctions, I will here simply rely on the prestige of the distinctions and the
fact that philosophers of widely differing views have found them helpful and
important. Law and philosophy are both in the distinction business, and law
would benefit from attention to distinctions that have survived considerable
philosophical scrutiny. While that scrutiny has, to be sure, not persuaded all
philosophers of the viability of the distinction between sense and reference, I
leave the task of persuading holdouts to other occasions and other

18. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). For more on Skidmore, see infra
notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
19. 1 JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 34–41 (8th ed. 1872) (Book I, chapter ii,
section 5).
20. RUDOLF CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY § 40, at 177–78 (1947). Unlike Mill and
Frege, Carnap did not invent his terminological distinction. Also, Meaning and Necessity does
not clearly explain intensions, as I will below, as functions from possible worlds to extensions.
Richard Montague credits Carnap’s unpublished work as providing the germ of this idea.
Richard Montague, On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities, 53 THE MONIST 159, 164
(1969). The basic terminology appears in Rudolf Carnap, Replies and Systematic Expositions, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLPH CARNAP 859–1013 (Paul Arthur Schilpp ed., 1963). See id. at
891 (referring to “possible states of the universe of discourse” with models, rather than linguistic
entities, as in earlier work).
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philosophers. I come not to praise the sense–reference distinction but simply
to use it, presupposing its praiseworthiness.
I will take as my interlocutors three constitutional theorists. The late Raoul
Berger,21 who condemned the modern Supreme Court for departing from the
specific expectations of the Framers, probably comes closest among modern
theorists to contending that everything should stay the same about the
Constitution as it bears on constitutional law. Despite this appearance, I will
argue that, if he is to make sense of simple Framer ignorance, Berger’s theory
cannot really hold all of constitutional culture fixed.
Two other thinkers who promote, as I do, a partially changing, partially
immutable interpretation of the Constitution are Jed Rubenfeld22 and Richard
Fallon.23 Rubenfeld thinks constitutional interpretation should take as its
anchor the original tangible paradigm cases, while original understandings of
the general categories encompassing these cases can be neglected. Richard
Fallon thinks that constitutional interpretation should be guided by a
recognition of five different modes of constitutional argument—text, original
history, precedent, structure, and policy. Fallon thinks all of these modes are
legitimate and should be brought into coherence if possible, but with a ranking
of modes in case of disagreement. I will argue that the Theory of Original
Sinn offers a more economical and more compelling theory, particularly when
we consider the possibility of factual errors by the Framers.
Finally, I will give a sketch of how the Theory of Original Sinn might be
deployed to assess whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids racially
segregated public schools, interacting both with Berger’s, Rubenfeld’s, and
Fallon’s arguments on the question and with Michael McConnell’s revisionary
account.24

21. See Berger, Reflections, supra note 16.
22. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119
(1995) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Reading]; Jed Rubenfeld, On Fidelity in Constitutional Law, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1469 (1997) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Fidelity]; Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment
and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085 (1998) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Moment]; JED
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001)
[hereinafter RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME]; JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY:
THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005) [hereinafter RUBENFELD,
REVOLUTION].
23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987). Fallon builds on the similar theory set out in
PHILIP BABBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
24. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947 (1995).
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II. SENSE, REFERENCE, AND THE THEORY OF ORIGINAL SINN
First I will briefly explain Frege’s distinction between sense and reference
and its kin. A word’s Fregean referent is the tangible actual thing in the world
that the word picks out, while the Fregean sense expressed in a word gives the
word’s cognitive value and the mode of presentation of the referent. Because
the sense of a word is what is strictly conveyed and expressed by the language
alone, sense is a natural touchstone for those who take constitutional language
as paramount. Frege introduces sense as the manner in which language
presents an object—the object’s mode of presentation:
It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name,
combination of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which may
be called the referent of the sign, also what I would like to call the sense of the
sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained.25

To use an expression to pick out a particular object we must first grasp the
property conveyed in the word’s sense, and only then see what object has that
particular property.
Frege says, “A proper name (word, sign, sign
combination, expression) expresses its sense, refers to or designates its
referent. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its referent.”26
While Frege does not give any algorithm for discovering or grasping sense, the
existence of functioning languages shows that it is possible: “The sense of a
proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the
language or totality of designations to which it belongs.”27
Frege’s basic insight is that we can pick out an object by means of
different unique properties. The same thing may have multiple informationally
distinct descriptions. A fork on the northeast corner of a table may be referred
to as either “the easternmost fork on this table” or “the northernmost fork on
this table.” Each description picks out the same fork. But the descriptions do
not mean the same thing. To the question, “Is the northernmost fork the same
as the easternmost fork?” Frege offers terminology for a nuanced response:
the referents of “the northernmost fork” and “the easternmost fork” are the
same, but their senses are different, because north does not mean east. Imagine
that we have one fork in the northeast quadrant of a table with empty northwest
and southeast quadrants. The rules “remove all forks on the northern half of
the table” and “remove all forks on the eastern half of the table” will be two
different ways to accomplish the command to remove the same fork. But the
rules are obviously different. Even though the reference of “all forks on the
northern half of the table” is the same as the reference of “all forks on the
eastern half of the table,” the senses of these two expressions are different.

25. Frege, Sense and Reference, supra note 17, at 210.
26. Id. at 214.
27. Id. at 210.
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Frege’s distinction has been enormously influential in the past century of
philosophy of language.28 Much of this influence is transmitted through one of
Frege’s last students, Rudolph Carnap, whose distinction between intension
and extension is closely related to the distinction between sense and reference
and represents one of its most important refinements.29 Carnap’s extensions
are Fregean referents: actual tangible objects in the world. As standardly
glossed, Carnap’s intensions are functions from possible worlds to extensions,
and are determined by an expression’s sense.30 This formulation makes
particularly clear that the facts about the world stand in the gap between
intension and extension. The same is true of the gap between sense and
reference. To learn the referent of a word, we must first know its sense. The
sense of an expression will determine a function from how the world is to the
referent; we then plug in the way the world is and finally have our referent. In
our fork example, the phrase “all forks on the eastern half of the table” will
express a sense that determines a function from the set of different ways the
table could be arranged to the set of particular forks on the table’s eastern half.
To know what “eastern half of the table” means, I must be able, given an
arrangement of the table, to say whether an object is on the eastern half. To
apply our command to remove the eastern-half forks, we must (a) know this
function, i.e., know what “fork on the eastern half of the table” means, and (b)
know what to plug into the function, i.e., know the arrangement of the table.
In giving the Framers only the authority to determine sense, and hence
intension, of their language, but not the authority to determine that language’s
reference or extension, the Theory of Original Sinn thus divides authority
between the Framers and later interpreters: the Framers are in charge of setting
the sense; later interpreters are in charge of assessing the reference-yielding
facts.
Intensions are closely related to senses, but are not quite the same. Senses
are more finely grained, and intensions less so. Intensions supervene on
senses: that is, two expressions could not have the same sense, but express
28. See, e.g., infra note 66.
29. See Jerrold J. Katz, The Problem in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, 95 J. PHIL. 547, 553
(1998) (“Frege defined sense as the determiner of reference, and the subsequent Carnapian
doctrine on which sense is a function from possible worlds to extensions is only a slight
modification that brings Frege’s definition in line with the modal expansion of the universe.”).
30. See, e.g., David J. Chalmers, On Sense and Intension, 16 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 135, 145
(2002) [hereinafter Chalmers, Sense and Intension] (“[A]n expression’s sense might be seen as an
intension: a function from possibilities to extensions. This function takes a given possibility, and
associates it with an extension relative to that possibility.”); William G. Lycan, What is the
“Subjectivity” of the Mental?, 4 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 109, 113 (1990) (“Each concept or Fregean
intension can be represented in the standard way as a function from possible worlds to
extensions.”); Katz, supra note 29; see also MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 31 (2d ed. 1962) (“Why a term is applied to a set of objects is indicated
by its intension; the set of objects to which it is applicable constitutes its extension.”).
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different functions from possible worlds to referents; sense determines
intension.31 If two words point to something different in some possible world,
then they cannot have the same informational content. My theory that
provisions of the Constitution have unchanging senses therefore requires that
the provisions of the Constitution have unchanging intensions. But two words
or expressions could have the same intensions but different senses; intension
does not fully determine sense. For instance, “five minus two” has the same
referent as “seven minus four” in every possible world, and thus the same
intension, because numbers do not vary among different possible worlds. But
the expressions have different senses; they have different cognitive values.
Likewise, it is also plausible that two proper names might express the same
intension, because there is, for instance, no possible world in which Clark Kent
is not identical to Superman, but these two names represent different modes of
presentation of the one man.32
Notwithstanding this distinction between sense and intension, the gap
between intension and extension will be enough for my purposes. I want to
assess what about the Constitution should change when the state of the world
changes. Different ways in which a series of words can express the same
function from possible worlds to referents—that is, cases where expressions
have the same intension but different sense—will therefore not be my
immediate concern. The stronger view that provisions of the Constitution have
unchanging senses entails the weaker view that provisions of the Constitution
have unchanging intensions. The weaker view, however, will be enough for
me to distinguish and criticize other theories.
Frege’s predecessors also drew very similar distinctions. The most
important in English-language philosophy was John Stuart Mill, who
introduced “connotation” and “denotation” in his A System of Logic:
“[W]henever the names given to objects convey any information, that is,
whenever they properly have any meaning, the meaning resides not in what
they denote, but in what they connote.”33 Just as Fregean sense is the cognitive
value carried by a term, Millian connotation is the information a term conveys.
“[B]y learning what things it is a name of, we do not learn the meaning of the
name: for to the same thing we may, with equal propriety, apply many names,
not equivalent in meaning.”34 Millian connotation is the “information[al]”
content of an expression, which seems equivalent, at least for present purposes,
to Fregean sense. The Millian denotation of an expression is, like reference
and extension, the “things it is a name of.”

31.
32.
33.
34.

See COHEN & NAGEL, supra note 30, at 30–31.
See SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (2d ed. 1980).
1 MILL, supra note 19, at 36.
Id. at 40.
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I cannot here give a full defense of the Theory of Original Sinn,35 but let
me give a brief initial motivation for the theory. We might be tempted to think
that it is only the referents of constitutional expressions—the particular, actual
tangible constitutional consequences with which we must deal—that matter.
We are practical people, concerned first and foremost with tangible
constitutional consequences, and life is short. If the sense is not reducible to
actual, tangible constitutional consequences, why should we care about it as a
constitutional matter? The core intuition is this: sense matters because it
matters what the Constitution says about the actual, tangible constitutional
consequences. Constitutional sense is critical (a) because it matters what
information the constitutional text conveys about the constitutional
consequences, (b) because it matters under what mode of presentation the
Constitution gives us its consequences, and (c) because it matters what
implications the Constitution would have for a range of possible worlds
including, but not limited to, the actual one.
Indeed, it seems very plausible to me to say more. Our concern for the
constitutional referent, as those who live under the authority of the
Constitution, seems derivative from our concern for constitutional sense. Not
only is it not the case that we care only about particular actual constitutional
consequences to the exclusion of concern for constitutionally borne
information, constitutional mode of presentation, and constitutional
implications across multiple possible worlds, but our concern for particular,
tangible constitutional consequences derives from our concern for such
constitutional information and mode of presentation. We care about the
constitutional referent because the Constitution, by expressing its sense,
conveys information about it and thereby points us to it, forbidding or
commanding it.
If we care about the reference, extension, and denotation of constitutional
language only because we care about that language’s sense, intension, and
connotation, then the Theory of Original Sinn is the natural position to take.
The sense of constitutional language is a sensible constitutional touchstone and
35. In a work in progress, I consider one way to use the Constitution’s self-referring clauses
(the clauses which use “this Constitution” or “here” or “now”) to construct an argument that, if
we agree with the Constitution’s view of itself, we should think of it as a historically embodied
textual assertion of authority, and that such a constitutional ontology would point toward some
form of originalist textualism as the proper theory of constitutional law (if we agree with that
assertion of authority). For a similar argument, produced independently of my own views, see
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127–31 (2003). “The document itself . . . appears to
prescribe textualism (in some form or another) as the proper mode of interpretation and
application of the Constitution by those holding office under it.” Id. at 1128 (arguing from the
Supremacy Clause). But here, I am mainly concerned to give an explanation of my view and
distinguish it from other prominent theories in a way that can highlight some problems with those
rivals.
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compelling candidate for what we should hold fixed when time passes and the
world changes. Whatever we hold fixed constitutionally as the world changes
should be the sort of thing that can take into account differences in possible
worlds, and not be subject to them: a function from possible worlds to
outcomes fits the bill. Likewise, what we keep fixed in the Constitution
should, in advance of knowing the facts about how the world may change, give
us information about our constitutional outcomes and tell us in what guise or
mode of presentation we should look for them. Connotation and sense
accomplish this task.36
36. At this point I should acknowledge my debt, not just to the United States Supreme Court
and High Court of Australia, whose statements suggesting the Theory of Original Sinn I will
exposit below, but to many other contemporary thinkers about the Constitution who have hinted
at a similar position. None of them, however, has rested a full-blown theory of constitutional
change on the sense–reference distinction. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of
Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 582 (1998), defend at length “a distinction between two
uses of the term ‘meaning’ to diagnose the flaw in a seemingly natural line of argument leading to
the proposition that constitutional interpretation must respect original practices.” At one point,
they cite Frege, without much extensive deployment of the philosophy of language. Id. at 588–89
n.84. Michael W. McConnell criticizes Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and “those
who interpret the Constitution as if it froze into place the conclusions reached at the time of the
framing about the application of constitutional principles to concrete situations.” Michael W.
McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 361–62 (1987). Robert
Bork briefly suggests such a view in the midst of an excess of bomb-throwing rhetoric. He
defends Brown on the ground of factual change and/or Framer error, suggesting that what is really
fixed at the time of the framing is, as the Theory of Original Sinn would have it, a factunsaturated major premise, i.e., a function from possible worlds to outcomes. See ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 162–63 (1990)
(“[A]ll that a judge committed to original understanding requires is that the text, structure, and
history of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a major premise. That
major premise is the principle or stated value that the ratifiers wanted to protect against hostile
legislation or executive action. The judge must then see whether that principle or value is
threatened by the statute or action challenged in the case before him. The answer to that question
provides his minor premise, and the conclusion follows.”); id. at 82 (allowing for Framer error:
“[E]quality and segregation were mutually inconsistent, though the framers did not understand
that.”); see also Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100
HARV. L. REV. 751, 758 (1986) (“[I]t is the very essence of general terms that they are capable of
governing particular cases not envisaged by their authors. General terms are not mere compendia
of the specific instances imagined by those individuals who first enunciated them. What the
miracle of language requires is that words, ideas, and concepts reach new instances.”) (footnote
omitted); Patrick J. Kelley, An Alternative Originalist Opinion for Brown v. Board of Education,
20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 76 (1995) (“[T]he intended general meaning of statutory language is not
reducible to the set of specifically intended applications of that statutory language. . . .
[L]egislative intent is best understood as the intent to adopt directive language with a particular
general meaning and to bring about the consequences flowing from the consistent application of
that general meaning in particular circumstances. Thus, although the intended general meaning is
fixed by legislative action and does not thereafter change, the set of factual applications of that
fixed general meaning may expand or contract with the application of the fixed general meaning
to changed circumstances. New situations, unheard of at the time the statute was enacted, may
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fall squarely within the fixed intended meaning.”); Gerard V. Bradley, The Bill of Rights and
Originalism, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 417, 420 (“The Constitution is not a collage of photographs of
early national America, much less of ancient Palestine. The Constitution is comprised of
principles whose practical import changes with time—as America changes—even as the
principles remain the same.”); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation,
25 FED. L. REV. 1, 31 (1997) (expositing the theory adopted by the Australian High Court: “The
distinction between connotation and denotation derives from the philosophy of John Stuart Mill,
and is similar to if not equivalent to the modern distinctions between sense and reference, and
intension and extension. . . . [T]he world which the word refers to; its connotation, sense or
intension consists of the criteria which define it, and thereby determine its denotation.”). But see
id. at 32 (“But in many cases the connotation/denotation distinction can be very difficult, and
perhaps in some cases impossible, to apply.”). For a parallel suggestion regarding statutes, see
M.B.W. Sinclair, Legislative Intent: Fact or Fabrication?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1329, 1358–63
(1996) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994), and
suggesting that an emphasis on intension over extension in statutory interpretation can resolve
several objections to legislative intent).
Without presenting a general theory of interpretation, Hugo Adam Bedau deploys Frege
on sense and reference against Professor Berger:
[N]o general term, in or out of the Constitution, in 1789 or today, ever means the things to
which it refers. For a century at least, philosophers have been explaining this lesson to all
who will listen and think. [Bedau here cites Frege.] A fortiori, the constitutional phrase
“cruel and unusual punishments” does not mean those particular punishments (whatever
they all were) to which it was initially used to refer—or, for that matter, those to which
you or I might use it to refer today. What the term does mean, to be sure, is related to
certain (authentic or putative) properties of the class of things to which it refers. What are
those properties? More precisely, what were they in 1789? Until we know this clearly
and indisputably, we cannot claim to know what the term means . . . . [I]n keeping with
the fact that “cruel and unusual punishments” is a general term, not a proper name or an
abbreviation for a handful of definite descriptions of specific punishments, neither Berger
nor anyone else can cash it in favor of an exhaustive list of all and only those punishments
that in 1789 were judged by the Framers to meet this description. The “Framers and
Ratifiers” chose to formulate their prohibition in general and (pace [member of the First
Congress William L.] Smith) “indefinite” terms, and they must be presumed to have
intended the semantic consequences of this act.
Hugo Adam Bedau, Berger’s Defense of the Death Penalty: How Not to Read the Constitution,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1152, 1161–62 (1982) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE
SUPREME COURT’S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982)). In reply, Berger agreed that for him, “The
Founders clearly tied ‘meaning’ to ‘reference.’” Raoul Berger, Death Penalties and Hugo Bedau:
A Crusading Philosopher Goes Overboard, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 873 (1984). For a discussion,
see infra text accompanying notes 68–72.
My view is briefly suggested and rejected, in a Millian rather than Fregean guise, by
Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (1977) (“While it is true that the meaning of a term (‘connotation’)
can remain constant even though the objects to which it applies (‘denotation’) may change, [here
Munzer and Nickel footnote to Mill’s A System of Logic] this simple distinction is not helpful
when new items included under a term are significantly dissimilar from those previously
recognized.”).
It is also worth mentioning that E.D. Hirsch, Jr., who holds that an interpreted text has a
fixed “meaning” but changing “significance,” uses Frege on sense and reference as the basis for
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Let me deal here with two objections to using Frege or other philosophers
of language in this way: vagueness, and the doctrine that sense determines
reference.
The first objection is that Frege did not intend his analysis to apply to
actual, functioning languages, but only to an ideal language; he did not aim to
describe how words actually functioned, but only how they might function, if
we were to eliminate a number of infelicities that infect languages like German
and English. The chief idealization that Frege made was in assuming that
conceptual boundaries are sharp, with no vagueness.37 But actual language is
vague.
I cannot give a full account here of the role of vagueness in the law.
Vagueness itself has an enormous philosophical literature, and philosophers
have not themselves reached any sort of consensus on what they have learned
about it.38 There is thus surely no prefabricated “what philosophy has learned
about vagueness” that we can simply import into constitutional interpretation.

his distinction. See E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 242 (1967). The fact that
Hirsch relies on sense and reference for his theory of interpretation suggests strongly that the
Theory of Original Sinn should be compatible with a view that, as Hirsch’s does, makes the
author’s intention primary. I do not have the time or space here to make clear how to reconcile
my view with such intentionalism, but I believe that it can be done; the main point in such a
reconciliation would be the thought that we have good reason to think that an author intends the
textually expressed sense, rather than his understood reference, to bind interpreters. For a
different approach, in which the author’s intent might side with reference or with sense on
different occasions, see Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and
the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357,
369 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) [hereinafter Alexander, All or Nothing at All?] (“What we want
to know—given some fact situation, the authorities’ semantic understandings, the true nature of
that to which their terms refer, and so on—is what they determined should be the legal effect of
their action. Because the authorities’ exemplars may be inconsistent . . . with the true nature of
the terms’ referents, the question is which did they intend to dominate in cases of such
inconsistency. In some cases, perhaps, referents will dominate definitions and exemplars. In
other cases, definitions or exemplars will dominate.”) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 361 n.11
(relying on a later article by Hirsch, Counterfactuals in Interpretation, in INTERPRETING LAW
AND LITERATURE (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988)); LARRY ALEXANDER &
EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 106
(2001) [hereinafter ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES] (repeating the passage just
quoted from All or Nothing at All?); id. at 243 n.9 (again relying on Hirsch).
37. See, e.g., Gary Kemp, Frege’s Sharpness Requirement, 46 PHIL. Q. 168, 168 (1996)
(“[Frege] also stressed that there can be no such thing as a concept which is not, as he put it,
sharp: for every concept and object whatsoever, either the object falls under the concept, or it
falls under its contradictory. Thus only sentences whose predicates are defined for every object
whatsoever as argument can be true. And that seems manifestly wrong.”).
38. See, e.g., Alphabetical Bibliography on Vagueness and the Sorites Paradox,
http://www.btinternet.com/~justin.needle/bib_alpha.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005) (listing
several hundred philosophical discussions of vagueness). For one systematic application of
vagueness to the law, see generally TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000).
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However, a sketch of my theory of vagueness and how it might apply to
the law should be helpful. We should distinguish three different phenomena
related to whether an instance falls under a concept: (a) ignorance about where
the boundaries of a concept lie; (b) intermediacy in the application of a
concept, so that it applies only somewhat, neither applying to the instance
completely nor not applying to the instance at all; and (c) indeterminacy about
whether a concept applies to an instance, so that there is no right answer to
whether the concept applies. My view of vagueness, as a general matter, is
this: we can explain away the appearance of indeterminacy as a mixture of
ignorance and intermediacy. Expressions might only partially apply to some
instances, and we might not know whether expressions apply to particular
instances, but there are no predicates for which there is no answer about
whether, and to what extent, they apply.
Consider an instance of vagueness: how many hairs does Harry need to
lose to be bald? Suppose that if he had 100,000 hairs on his head, he would
clearly not be bald, and if he had none, he would clearly be bald. Imagine
plucking out Harry’s hair one by one: a sequence of cases from 100,000 hairs
down to 0. Where is the dividing line where baldness begins? I would say that
at some point, it is right to say that Harry begins to be a little bit bald. He goes
from being not bald at all to being bald to approximately degree 1/n, where n is
the number of hairs in the transition stage. We do not know exactly which
hair’s removal would make the difference—this is where ignorance fits into
my story—but this ignorance is not a problem, because the hair only marks the
difference between being bald to degree 0 and being bald to degree 1/n for
fairly large n.
To apply my theory of vagueness to the law, we would need to decide what
to do with the two phenomena to which I would reduce it: intermediacy and
ignorance.
The law could recognize intermediacy, or partial constitutionality, in
different ways. It is not clear what courts should do in cases where it seems
that an action is only somewhat constitutional—neither fully allowed nor fully
forbidden. One way to perform such baby-splitting is through the use of
partial liability rules, rather than property rules.39 In a case of partial
constitutionality, an actor could be made to pay some cost for its actions, but
not as much as in a case of fully unconstitutional behavior. Alternatively, the
law might continue to draw sharp boundaries around its concepts, but
recognize that the rules it implements do not precisely replicate the
constitutional categories: they implement the Constitution, rather than simply

39. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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enforcing it.40 There may be important elements, for this reason and for many
others, for which constitutional law must go beyond constitutional
interpretation; my concern here is chiefly with interpretation.
The second phenomenon to which I would reduce vagueness, besides
intermediacy, is ignorance. Ignorance of the law is, of course, a common
phenomenon. Ignorance is why we have to have lawyers and academics, and
why constitutional interpretation is hard work. We should not be surprised that
we are constitutionally ignorant; indeed, there would be no need for a theory of
constitutional interpretation if we could always easily know the answers to
interpretive questions. The historical work necessary to discern what sense
was expressed by an expression can be substantial—it can be as hard as
learning a foreign language. Further, it can also be hard to find out the
reference-yielding facts. The Theory of Original Sinn leaves ample room for
constitutional ignorance, but this fact renders the theory plausible, not
useless.41
A second objection to the use of Frege in this way is his doctrine that
“sense determines reference”—not that sense determines reference in
conjunction with the facts, but that it determines reference full-stop, all on its
own. This complaint is related to Frege’s much-discussed troubles regarding
indexicals such as “here,” “now,” and “I.”42 Frege claimed that the word “I”
has a different sense when I use it than when you do.43 We can see why this
makes some sense. The word “I” surely expresses a different function from
possible worlds to individuals when different people use it. Sense, for Frege,
does not attach to expressions as such, but to expressions used in a context.
But at certain points, Frege does seem to use Sinn to refer to the qualities of an

40. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001)
[hereinafter FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Foreword]. I
respond below to Fallon’s claims about originalism and Brown v. Board of Education. See infra
text accompanying notes 252–59.
41. Ignorance chiefly points to the need for hard work, but it would also be good to have an
account of constitutional presumptions that would tell us what to do when constitutional
ignorance seems ineliminable. For one such account, see Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its
Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411 (1996).
42. See John Perry, Frege on Demonstratives, 86 PHIL. REV. 474, 488–91 (1977); David
Kaplan, Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of
Demonstratives and Other Indexicals, in THEMES FROM KAPLAN 481 (Joseph Almog et al. eds.,
1989) [hereinafter Kaplan, Demonstratives]; David Kaplan, Afterthoughts, in THEMES FROM
KAPLAN, supra, at 565 [hereinafter Kaplan, Afterthoughts].
43. Gottlob Frege, The Thought: A Logical Inquiry, BEITRAGE ZUE PHILOSOPHIE DES
DEUTSCHEN IDEALISMUS, (1918–1919), reprinted in 65 MIND 289, 296 (1956) (“The same
utterance containing the word ‘I’ will express different thoughts in the mouths of different
[people], of which some may be true, others false.”).
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expression as such.44 Kaplan alleges that Frege confuses what Kaplan calls
content and character.45 Kaplan’s content is essentially Carnapian intension—
a function from possible worlds to individuals, or something that determines
intension.46 But Kaplan’s character is a function from contexts of utterance to
content.47 So the phrase “my dog” has a certain character attached to it in
virtue of the role of that expression (which is in turn determined by the roles of
its constituents) in our language. When I speak the phrase “my dog,” I do so in
a particular context that makes clear that I am the one speaking, and that it is
my dog that I am talking about. We plug that context into the character of the
expression “my dog” and learn the content of that expression on that
occasion—that is, a function that points to my dog (i.e., Chris Green’s dog) in
every possible world where I have a dog. We plug the actual world into the
function and find that the expression refers to my dog.
Now, all of this is how Kaplan cleans up Frege’s discussion of indexicals.
Words do not always pick out referents on their own, but only given (a) a
context of utterance and (b) a state of the world. From what Frege says about
indexicals, it is relatively clear that Frege includes context within Sinn; the
same word in different contexts produces different senses.48 Some interpreters
would claim that Frege also includes the state of the world within Sinn, so that
a change in the state of the world would, like a change in context, produce a

44. See id. at 296–98.
45. See Kaplan, Demonstratives, supra note 42, at 501 n.26, 506–07; Kaplan, Afterthoughts,
supra note 42, at 568 (“Fregean Sinn conflates elements of two quite different notions of
meaning. One, which I called character, is close to the intuitive idea of linguistic meaning (and
perhaps of cognitive content). Another, which I called content, is what is said or expressed by an
expression in a particular context of use. The content of an utterance of a complete sentence is a
truth-bearing proposition.”).
46. See Kaplan, Demonstratives, supra note 42, at 500–05. “Just as it was convenient to
represent contents by functions from possible circumstances to extensions (Carnap’s intentions
[sic]), so it is convenient to represent characters by functions from possible contexts to contents.”
Id. at 505.
47. See id. at 505–07.
48. See, e.g., Frege, supra note 43, at 296.
If a time indication is needed by the present tense one must know when the sentence was
uttered to apprehend the thought correctly. Therefore the time of the utterance is part of
the . . . thought. . . . The case is the same with words like “here” or “there”. In all such
cases the mere wording, as it is given in writing, is not the complete expression of the
thought, but the knowledge of certain accompanying conditions of utterance, which are
used as means of expressing the thought, are needed for its correct apprehension. The
pointing of fingers, hand movements, glances may belong here too. The same utterance
containing the word “I” will express different thoughts in the mouths of different [people],
of which some may be true, others false.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

ORIGINALISM AND THE SENSE–REFERENCE DISTINCTION

573

different Sinn.49 The advantage of this interpretation is that then Sinn has
everything required to produce a referent. Sense determines reference, fullstop, no need for fussing with qualifications like “given the state of the world.”
There are at least two reasons to think, though, that Frege would not make
this move, reasons why he would consider the facts of the world to be separate
from sense. First, he repeatedly says that sense is what a word expresses.50
And while it is plausible to say that a word expresses its context, merely by
being uttered in that context, it is not plausible at all to say that a word
expresses the facts about the world that determine what it designates. Second,
Frege explicitly characterizes Sinn as the content that gets passed on from
generation to generation.51 Assuming that Frege thought that the state of the
world changes, it follows that Sinn can be stable, changes in the referenceyielding state of the world notwithstanding.52
David Chalmers’s comments on whether sense needs the facts to determine
reference, or does it all by itself, seem just right.53 “Strong determination”

49. See infra note 53; but see Alonzo Church, Review, 8 J. SYMB. LOGIC 45, 47 (1943)
(reviewing Willard V. Quine, Notes on Existence and Necessity, 40 J. PHIL. 113 (1943)) (“[T]o
determine that two names or other expressions have the same sense it should be sufficient to
understand the expressions, but to determine that two names have the same denotation it is
commonly necessary to investigate the world.”).
50. See, e.g., Frege, Sense and Reference, supra note 17, at 214 (“A proper name (word,
sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense . . . .”).
51. See id. at 212 (“[T]he sign’s sense . . . may be the common property of many and
therefore is not a part or a mode of the individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind
has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.”) (footnote
omitted).
52. On the other hand, if Frege thought the state of the world does not change, perhaps
because facts about the future are in some sense already in existence now, then we could rephrase
talk about “changing” reference to talk about a “temporally variant” reference. Rather than
saying the referent changed between 1868 and today, we should say that part of the referent is
located in 1868 and part of it is located in 2004. To get the portion of the referent located in
2004, we would need the temporally uniform sense, plus the portion of the facts of the world
located in 2004. In what follows, I will retain the assumption that the world changes, though it
would not be difficult to translate my theory into the language of temporal variation rather than
change.
53. See Chalmers, Sense and Intension, supra note 30, at 140.
We might say that sense strongly determines extension if sense determines extension on
its own, without any further contribution from the world. In contemporary terms, we
might say that sense strongly determines extension if any two possible expressions that
have the same sense have the same extension. On this view, it seems that an expression’s
extension must somehow be present at least implicitly within its sense. While there are
some indications of this sort of view in Frege, this idea arguably stands in tension with the
idea that sense reflects cognitive significance. For example, the two terms “the morning
star” and “the evening star” have the same extension, but this sameness of extension does
not seem to be implicit in the cognitive roles of the terms. It is natural to suppose that
someone in a different environment might use a term with the same cognitive role but a

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

574

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:555

requires no reference-yielding facts, but “weak determination” does.
Chalmers’s weak determination is what I will use to present my Theory of
Original Sinn. I will proceed, then, on the assumption that Chalmers and
Carnap are right, and that there is an important phenomenon, which may or
may not be Fregean sense, but which determines reference only given the state
of the world. I may thereby sacrifice some Fregean prestige for my position,
relying only on that of Carnap, Mill, and their followers, but that seems enough
to motivate us to think the distinction viable.
III. THE THEORY OF ORIGINAL SINN AND THE COURTS
A.

The United States Supreme Court

The Theory of Original Sinn is in essence an elaboration of the theory of
fixed meaning and mutable application once endorsed (and never repudiated)
by the Supreme Court itself. Justice Brewer, writing for the Supreme Court in
1905 in South Carolina v. United States, wrote:
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not
alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means now. Being a grant of
powers to a government, its language is general; and, as changes come in
social and political life, it embraces in its grasp all new conditions which are
within the scope of the powers in terms conferred. In other words, while the
powers granted do not change, they apply from generation to generation to all
things to which they are in their nature applicable. This in no manner abridges
the fact of its changeless nature and meaning.54

Through Justice Sutherland, the Court elaborated on the same idea while
referring to a statute in its 1926 decision, Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.
United States.55 The Court appealed to the “universal law of language,” which
allows that “words do not change their meaning; but the application of words
different extension. Similarly, it is not clear how the truth of a statement such as “There
are 90 chemical elements that occur in nature” could be determined by its cognitive role
alone.
Alternatively, we can say that sense weakly determines extension if extension is
determined by sense in conjunction with the world. It is natural to suppose that the
sentence just mentioned is true not just because of its sense, but because of the way the
world is. Likewise, it seems plausible that a term such as “the morning star” refers to the
planet Venus not just because of its sense, but because of the way the world is.
Id. One of the philosophers most responsible for Frege’s influence, Alonzo Church, read Fregean
sense as requiring facts about the world to determine reference. See Church, supra note 49, at 47;
Alonzo Church, Review, 7 J. SYMB. LOGIC 47, 47 (1942) (reviewing Frege, Sense and Reference,
supra note 17) (“Two proper names coinciding in sense must have the same denotation—
although to determine the denotation, given the sense, may require settling a question of extralinguistic fact.”).
54. 199 U.S. 437, 448–49 (1905).
55. 271 U.S. 603 (1926).
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grows and expands.”56 Justice Sutherland said much the same thing about the
Constitution, writing for the Court later in 1926, in Village of Euclid, Ohio v.
Ambler Realty Co. The Court said:
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties [sic] never varies, the scope
of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a
changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise. . . . [A] degree of
elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of
constitutional principles . . . .”57

The South Carolina and Euclid doctrine of constitutional change has not
been invoked much recently by the Supreme Court, but it has not been
repudiated.58 It is instructive to note that some of the critics of South
Carolina’s doctrine on constitutional change have explicitly embraced a theory
of language that denies any room for Fregean sense, as distinct from reference.
After quoting the formulation above, Jacobus tenBroek condemns it because “a
word or expression possesses no intrinsic significance; the meaning of a word
or expression is the thing or things to which it refers.”59 He later stresses, “The
56. See id. at 607.
But it is urged that thus to construe the act of 1916 is to enlarge the authority of Congress
under the land grant acts, so as to permit that body to require the land grant roads, without
compensation, to perform service in addition to that embraced within the word
“transportation.” It is said that railway postal cars originated after the passage of the land
grant acts. But it does not follow that such cars are not fairly within the meaning of those
acts as essentially incident to transportation. The provision reaches into the future, and,
while its meaning does not change, its application may well embrace new conditions and
new instrumentalities which come within the scope of the terms employed. This is in
accordance with the universal law of language. In a sense, words do not change their
meaning; but the application of words grows and expands with the growth and expansion
of society.
Id. (citation omitted).
57. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
58. Justice Thomas was the latest Justice to invoke this doctrine, arguing in a separate
opinion, “When interpreting the Free Speech and Press Clauses, we must be guided by their
original meaning, for ‘[t]he Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not
alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means now.’” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting South Carolina, 199 U.S. at 448)
(alteration in original).
59. Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, 27 CAL. L. REV.
399, 415 (1939).
Now the striking thing about this statement, and most of those which are patterned
after it, is not the clear view which it gives of the unadjustability of the intent theory to the
fact of the changing meaning of the Constitution, but the flagrant begging of the question
and subterfuge of words in which the Court indulges when seeking to force a process of
constitutional development into the confines of a theory which describes it as fixed and
static. The exact theoretical problem in each constitutional case is one of constitutional
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meaning of terms cannot be changeless if their application is extensible
because their meaning is not only determined by, but is the extent of their
application.”60 TenBroek’s constitutional universe contains only reference,
extension, and denotation: he allows only a collection of constitutional
consequences, and no textually expressed meaning that might be stable while
circumstances change. He has no room for sense, intension, or connotation.
Insofar as tenBroek’s position follows, as I think it does, from his rejection of
any notion of the sense of a word (as distinguished from its referent), it is plain
that the sense–reference distinction or its kin are critical to maintaining the
view of South Carolina.
B.

The High Court of Australia

It is very interesting to add here that the High Court of Australia and other
courts in Australia have been quite explicit in using Millian language to
explain essentially the same theory that the United States Supreme Court set
out in South Carolina and that I defend here. Justice Windeyer explained in
1959 in Ex Parte Professional Engineers’ Ass’n:
We must not, in interpreting the Constitution, restrict the denotation of its
terms to the things they denoted in 1900. The denotation of words becomes
enlarged as new things falling within their connotations come into existence or
become known. But in the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or
connotations of its words should remain constant. We are not to give words a
meaning different from any meaning which they could have borne in 1900.
Law is to be accommodated to changing facts. It is not to be changed as
language changes.61

meaning; namely, whether the particular matter before the Court does or does not fall
within the meaning of the language used in the document. This problem cannot be solved
by saying that the Constitution “embraces in its grasp all new conditions which are within
the scope of the powers in terms conferred” or by urging that the powers granted apply “to
all things to which they are in their nature applicable” because the precise inquiry is
whether the matter before the Court is or is not “within the scope of the powers in terms
conferred” or whether the powers granted are “in their nature applicable” to it. In the
progress of that inquiry, it must not be forgotten that a word or expression possesses no
intrinsic significance; the meaning of a word or expression is the thing or things to which
it refers. And in deciding whether or not the new matter before the Court is a referent of a
constitutional clause, that constitutional clause is being redefined and its meaning
changed.
Id. (emphasis added). A bit later, tenBroek quotes Justice Sutherland’s comment regarding
constitutional provisions: “[T]heir meaning is changeless; it is only their application which is
extensible.” Id. at 416 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 451 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting)).
60. Id.
61. 107 C.L.R. 208, 267 (Austl.). A long string of other opinions have followed this
language. Justice Taylor explained in 1964,
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It may, no doubt, be true to say that the ordinary principles of interpretation require that
constitutional provisions conferring authority upon Parliament to make laws shall bear the
meaning which they had at the time of Federation but it is beyond question that, although
the meaning of these terms does not change, their denotation must extend as new concepts
develop.
Lansell v. Lansell (1964) 110 C.L.R. 353, 366 (Austl.). Justice Windeyer added in the same case,
“The content of a constitutional power is determined by the connotation of the words in which it
is expressed, not limited by their denotation at any particular time.” Id. at 370. Chief Justice
Barwick noted in 1970, “I can see no reason why, whilst the connotation of the word ‘gas’ will be
fixed, its denotation cannot change with changing technologies.” Lake Macquarie Shire Council
v. Aberdare County Council (1970) 123 C.L.R. 327, 331 (Austl.). Chief Justice Barwick
explained in 1972,
There are some basic propositions of constitutional construction which are beyond
controversy. . . . The connotation of words employed in the Constitution does not change
though changing events and attitudes may in some circumstances extend the denotation or
reach of those words. These propositions are fully documented in the reported decisions
of this Court which has the task of finally and authoritatively deciding both the
connotation and the denotation of the language of the Constitution.
King v. Jones (1972) 128 C.L.R. 221, 229 (Austl.). In 1979, Chief Justice Barwick added,
The full connotation of the description “trading corporation” cannot be displaced by the
denotation it may have had at any past time. It is a power evidently intended to be
available in circumstances current in future times. Like other descriptive expressions in
the Constitution, e.g.[,] telephonic communication, the description “trading corporation”
must be allowed to embrace all that may fall within it according to its natural meaning and
the circumstances of the time at which a decision as to validity or constitutional power has
to be made.
The Queen v. Federal Court of Austl.; ex parte W.A. Nat’l Football League (1979) 143 C.L.R.
190, 208 (Austl.). Judge Bignold of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales noted
in 1996, in South Sydney City Council v. C. Maloney Pty Ltd.:
[T]he connotation of the word in question, has, and necessarily will, remain the same. It
is the denotation (or the particularisation of the referents of a word) that is held to have
changed. . . . [W]hile the connotation of “hotel” has remained unchanged since 1946, its
denotation has varied over time and today embraces, for example, the use of pool tables
and casino/gaming machines.
S. Sydney City Council v. C. Maloney Pty Ltd., (1996) No. 40199, at 14–15 (Land and Env’t
Court of New S. Wales), available at http://austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/1996/48.html.
Justice McHugh explained in 1999 in the case Re Wakim; ex parte McNally, just before quoting
Justice Windeyer’s explanation from 1959, “Where the interpretation of individual words or
phrases of the Constitution is in issue, the current doctrine of the Court draws a distinction
between connotation and denotation or, in other words, between meaning and application.” In re
Wakim (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511, 551 (Austl.) (McHugh, J.). Regarding this suggestion and his use
of it, Justice McHugh went on to add, “Philosophers are now said to regard the distinction
between connotation and denotation as outdated.” Id. at 552 (footnote omitted) (For my response
to this comment, see infra note 63–67 and accompanying text.). Justice McHugh repeated much
the same thing in 2001 in the case Re Patterson, also quoting Justice Windeyer’s explanation
from 1959:
[T]he current doctrine of the Court draws a distinction between connotation and
denotation or meaning and application. . . . The Constitution contains terms “intended to
apply to the varying conditions which the development of our community must involve.”
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A cousin of the Theory of Original Sinn is alive and well in Australia, but
is not without its critics and is accompanied by some controversy. Justice
Kirby noted his disagreement with the connotation–denotation distinction in
Eastman v. The Queen, albeit without explanation.62 Further, even as he cited
earlier statements of the original-connotation theory, Justice McHugh
commented in the case Re Wakim, “Philosophers are now said to regard the
distinction between connotation and denotation as outdated.”63 This would be
an important criticism of the Theory of Original Sinn if philosophers really
thought that. But this statement turns out not to be founded on any explicit
work by philosophers. The source on whom Justice McHugh relies, law
professor Leslie Zines, gives no argument against the sense–reference
distinction, saying only, “Generally, the court has drawn a now outdated
philosophical distinction between connotation and denotation.”64 Zines does
not elaborate on why he thinks the distinction is “outdated” and cites no
philosophers or other discussions; indeed, this comment and its context have
remained unchanged (and unsupported) from his treatise’s first edition in 1981
to its fourth edition in 1997.65
Do philosophers really think the connotation–denotation distinction and its
kin are outdated? Obviously, I do not think so. David Chalmers offered one
recent extensive defense.66 However, Justice McHugh was also mistaken in
This Court has rarely hesitated to apply particular words and phrases to facts and
circumstances that were or may have been outside the contemplation of the makers of the
Constitution.
Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 C.L.R. 391, 426–27, 434 (Austl.) (footnote omitted).
“[A]lthough the meaning of a constitutional term remains constant, its denotation—the matters,
persons or things to which it applies—may change.” Id. at 434. Justice McHugh noted in 2000,
yet again quoting Justice Widener from 1959 and Chief Justice Barwick from 1972, “[T]he
jurisprudence of this Court has traditionally drawn a distinction between the connotation and
denotation of words.” Eastman v. The Queen (2000) 203 C.L.R. 1, 45 (Austl.) (emphases added)
(footnote omitted).
62. 203 C.L.R. at 80 (“Yet the Court, looking at the constitutional words with today’s eyes,
read them [in another case] so as to derive their contemporary meaning. There are many similar
illustrations. They are sometimes explained by reference to the disputable philosophical
distinction between the connotation and denotation of verbal meaning. I contest that
distinction.”) (footnote omitted). Alas, Justice Kirby did not further explain his dissent from the
connotation–denotation distinction.
63. 198 C.L.R. at 552 (citing LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 16
(3d ed. 1992)).
64. LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 17 (4th ed. 1997).
65. See id.; LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 15 (1st ed. 1981).
66. See Chalmers, Sense and Intension, supra note 30, at 178–79 (“[A] broadly Fregean
account of meaning is tenable. On this account, the notion of an epistemic intension plays the
role of a Fregean notion of sense. Epistemic intensions are not the same as Fregean sense in all
respects, but they are similar in many respects, and they allow versions of the core Fregean
requirements on sense to be satisfied. . . . [T]here is a strong prima facie case that epistemic
intensions exist and have the properties I have attributed to them . . . [T]he most obvious
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his suggestion that the philosophical viability of the distinction between
connotation and denotation matters little to the law.67 I disagree: the
philosophical viability of the connotation–denotation distinction is surely
decisively relevant to the law’s use of that distinction. If a distinction really
does not work when philosophers think carefully about it in their armchairs, it
will not work any better when judges think carefully about it in their chambers,
as they write appellate opinions. TenBroek is right to this extent: if we really
do think that there is nothing more to the meaning of a word than the collection
of tangible objects it picks out, then the Euclidean view of the interpretation of
an unchanging Constitution and its antipodal cousin are doomed. To be fair to
Justice McHugh, perhaps the courts could fashion a different rationale for the
application of words to circumstances outside the contemplation of the
Framers, but the rationale they now use should surely be abandoned if the
distinction on which it is based is philosophically flawed.
I now turn to three prominent alternative contemporary views of the nature
of the Constitution, and explain how the Theory of Original Sinn improves
upon them.
IV. BERGER: CONSTITUTIONAL STASIS?
I have already quoted two of Raoul Berger’s contentions that nothing about
the Constitution should change. In fact, in response to one reviewer, Hugo
Adam Bedau, who pressed Frege’s sense–reference distinction against him,68
Berger claimed, “All this may be most edifying to philosophers, but . . . . [t]he
Founders clearly tied ‘meaning’ to ‘reference.’”69 He has been explicit in
counterarguments can be rebutted.”). One philosopher who prominently dissents from many
aspects of Frege’s philosophy of language would nevertheless retain the sense–reference
distinction. Foreword to R.M. SAINSBURY, DEPARTING FROM FREGE, at i, i (2002) (“Gottlob
Frege is now regarded as one of the world’s greatest philosophers and the founder of modern
logic. In addition to his work on the foundations of mathematics, his writing on sense and
reference remains deeply influential. Departing from Frege takes Frege’s work as a point of
departure, but argues that we must depart considerably from Frege’s own views if we are to work
towards an adequate conception of natural language. Mark Sainsbury suggests that the two
aspects that are most important to retain in Frege’s work are the distinction between sense and
reference, and the possibility of sense without a referent.”).
67. See Re Wakim, 198 C.L.R. at 552 (“But whether criticism of the distinction is or is not
valid should not be seen as decisive. What is decisive is that, with perhaps only two exceptions,
the Court has never hesitated to apply particular words and phrases to facts and circumstances
that were or may have been outside the contemplation of the makers of the Constitution.”)
(footnote omitted).
68. Bedau, supra note 36, at 1161 (“[N]o general term, in or out of the Constitution, in 1789
or today, ever means the things to which it refers. For a century at least, philosophers have been
explaining this to all who will listen and think.”); id. at 1161 n.43 (citing Frege as “[t]he classic
source . . . .”).
69. Berger, supra note 36, at 872–73. To support this “identification of ‘meaning’ and
‘reference,’” Berger cites Thomson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898), apparently invoking this
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insisting that we should allow the Framers to determine both the constitutional
sense and reference.
Berger might be called a WWFD theorist. He seems to think that a simple,
one-step “What Would the Framers Do?” question can be asked of the
historical record to produce constitutional outcomes directly.70 But he has
trouble, I think, dealing with the cases in which the Theory of Original Sinn
would produce different results: the cases of Framer ignorance and Framer
error. Imagine that the Framers of a proportional system for states’
representation in the House all thought, incorrectly, that the population of New
Jersey was bigger than that of Connecticut. Thinking this, they enact a
provision: “States shall have a number of representatives in proportion to their
population.” So they all thought that the provision they enacted would give
New Jersey more representatives than Connecticut. But once the relevant
later-in-time interpreters conduct a census and discover their mistake, no one
would say that the effect of the provision should be to give New Jersey more
representatives, Connecticut’s larger population notwithstanding. Obviously,
the Framers would all have been wrong at the time of the framing about the
tangible consequences of the provision, but they would change their minds
when they found out the facts. They would think that their provision fixed not
actual imagined numbers of representatives, but a function from the relative
populations to numbers of representatives. Had the Framers wanted to give
New Jersey twice the representatives that Connecticut had, they could have
simply said, “New Jersey shall have twice the number of representatives as
Connecticut.” That provision would express a function from possible worlds
to constitutional outcomes that would not depend on population. But if the
provision mentions relative populations, then relative populations obviously
have to control the outcome, Framers’ expectations to the contrary
notwithstanding. We obviously cannot allow those sorts of errors to bind us as
later interpreters.
Knowing that the Framers were ignorant of certain facts about the world,
or might have made certain factual errors about the world, we have to modify
statement: “It must consequently be taken that the word ‘jury’ and the words ‘trial by jury’ were
placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the meaning affixed to them in
the law as it was in this country and in England at the time of the adoption of that
instrument . . . .” See id. at 869 n. 60; see also Thompson, 170 U.S. at 350.
70. For two commentators assuming that originalism is always such an approach, see
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884–85 (1995) (“For an originalist to believe that the
Fourteenth Amendment forbade school segregation, it would seem necessary to show, roughly
speaking, that a majority of state legislators in a supermajority of the states supported that
position at the time of ratification.”), and Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism,
Foundationalism, and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal
Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 829 n.67 (1990) (“[O]riginalism is essentially an historicist
methodology. It asks what the actual historical actors would choose.”).
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our “What would the Framers do?” question. Instead we must ask, “What
would the Framers do, if they had the facts right?” But which facts? If we
allow all facts on which we might disagree with the Framers, including our
substantive views on political morality, the WWFD question reduces to: “What
would the Framers do, if they agreed with us about everything?”—that is, to:
“What would we do?” And we do not need a constitution to tell us that.
But any attempt to cabin the scope of the relevance of Framer error or
ignorance will amount to a theory of constitutional change. Filling in the X for
“What would the Framers do, if they agreed with us about X?” will tell us
which attributes of the Constitution are subject to change and which are not.
The factors falling outside X are fixed, but those related to X are not. If we are
required to correct some of the Framers’ errors, we need to know which ones.
To the extent that it refuses to acknowledge any change pertaining to the
Constitution, Berger’s theory will not tell us which Framer errors we need to
correct, or which gaps in knowledge we need to fill.
Put another way, Berger’s emphasis on the tangible examples considered
by the enactors of the Constitution does not tell us how to proceed to additional
cases. There must be some features of the originally considered cases that are
not essential to the constitutional meaning. For instance, for all of the original
applications of the Fourteenth Amendment envisioned by its Framers, it is true
that they involve laws and persons that existed between 1866 and 1868. But
that cannot be an essential property of such applications. Without presenting a
theory of how to pick among new cases lacking properties possessed by all of
the originally imagined referents of a provision, Berger’s theory simply fails to
be any kind of theory of an enduring Constitution. It is instead a theory of a
Constitution of individual past instances, not a theory of a Constitution of
categories with enduring contemporary significance.
Further, as will become clearer below, when I turn to the issue of racial
school segregation, Berger in his actual work derives beliefs about the
Fourteenth Amendment too quickly from the Framers’ contemporary practice.
We must be wary of committing the same mistake that Chief Justice Taney
made in Dred Scott:71 assuming perfect cognitive coherence in the Framers. In
his argument that the Declaration of Independence must have excluded black
people from its language, because of the existence of other actions by its
authors inconsistent with thinking that “all men,” black men included, are
“created equal,” Taney said, “[T]he men who framed this declaration were
great men—high in literary acquirements—high in their sense of honor, and
incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were
acting.”72 Alas, we are all eminently capable of asserting principles
inconsistent with our actions. And it is a good thing, too, as our actions are
71. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
72. Id. at 410.
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frequently the wrong ones, and we at least want our principles to be the right
ones. If hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, it is a tribute worth
paying. The possibility of a separation between principles and action allows us
to think in a principled way about how we act and commit ourselves to
principles that we later work into practice, rather than having to reform our
actions first, and only then assert our principles. To be sure, if we see someone
doing X, of course we have a reason to think that he does not believe X is
wrong (or unconstitutional). But the reason is defeasible and frequently
defeated.
It is likewise important to keep in mind the possibility that the Framers, if
asked a question, would not have had a belief either way. We surely have the
power to sincerely enunciate and endorse principles that we know are
inconsistent with our other actions. That is, we can be consciously akratic.
And it is even more obvious that we have the power to sincerely enunciate and
endorse principles that, for all we know, might be inconsistent with our other
actions. We can commit ourselves in ways the consistency of which, with our
present practices, we are not at all sure about.
In sum, when we speak to the Framers and ask “Is X constitutional?”
questions, we must (a) be prepared for Framer ignorance, i.e., allow Framers to
mark “don’t know” as well as “yes” or “no”; and (b) in cases where we can get
a yes or no, get a reason why, a reasoned explanation, not just a yes or no. I
will apply these lessons to the issue of racial segregation of public schools
below.
V. RUBENFELD AND PARADIGM CASES
Unlike Berger, Rubenfeld takes as his fixed point merely the central
cases—the paradigm cases—that motivated the Framers.73 But even though
73. See Rubenfeld, Moment, supra note 22, at 1107 (“The meaning of a constitutional right
is forever anchored by these core or paradigm cases. By building doctrine around a provision’s
paradigm cases, interpretation will preserve the core historical meaning of a constitutional
commitment, without reducing constitutional meaning to the will of any particular moment, past
or present. Such paradigm cases give constitutional law its interpretive anchor and its root in the
nation’s history . . . .”); see also Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 22, at 1170 (“Paradigm cases
form the spine of interpretation on the model of writing.”); id. at 1172 (“[F]idelity to paradigm
cases is the means by which constitutional interpretation remains interpretation, rather than an
exercise in rewriting. It is the constraint that preserves a commitment’s core identity over time.
So long as interpretation takes its shape from the paradigm cases, constitutional law will remain
an interpretation of the commitments the people undertook, even though such law neither
conforms nor purports to conform with popular will at any time in the nation’s history or
future.”); Rubenfeld, Fidelity, supra note 22, at 1487 (“Let us . . . look at the Constitution as a set
of written political commitments whose definitive structure is and always remains given by what
those who fought for the constitutional commitment fought most centrally to accomplish.”); id. at
1485 (“What keeps the interpretation of a constitutional commitment anchored as interpretation
of this nation’s commitment (rather than what the same guarantee might mean in the life of some
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his deference to the Framers’ views about the constitutional referent is more
limited than is Berger’s, Rubenfeld’s paradigm-case method is subject to
essentially the same criticisms regarding Framer ignorance and mistakes that I
made of Berger.
Suppose that everyone in Congress thinks that North Korea possesses
nuclear weapons and certain sorts of dangerous intercontinental missiles. The
Congress passes a resolution: “The President may use force against any
country possessing nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles capable of
striking American soil.” The motivating paradigm case, everyone agrees, is
North Korea. But suppose that we then learn that everyone in Congress was
wrong about North Korea’s capabilities—in fact, the appearances of nuclear
weapons and intercontinental-missile programs were the result of a slick public
relations campaign and scientists who lied to superiors in order to keep their
jobs.
Obviously, if the authorization of force were written this way, it would not
apply to North Korea, despite the fact that it is the paradigm, motivating case.
Of course, if Congress authorized the President to “use force against North
Korea,” it would still apply to North Korea, even if that authorization were
predicated on a mistake. But not if the authorization explicitly applies only to
the countries with the characteristics Congress thought North Korea had. The
choice of language is a choice about what sorts of changes should make a
difference to the set of future applications. The sense of this provision would
concern the informational content related to nuclear weapons and
intercontinental missiles. The intension of the provision is a function from
worlds to the countries in those worlds that possess nuclear weapons and
intercontinental missiles capable of striking American soil, and that function
does not yield North Korea when the actual world is plugged into it. It seems
plain that the originally intended referent should give way whenever it
conflicts with the originally intended sense, applied to the actual facts.
Rubenfeld has considered this sort of example, in which constitutional
Framers have the facts wrong about their paradigm case.74 But his rejoinder
other nation) are the paradigm cases.”); id. at 1486 (“So long as interpretation adheres to the
paradigm cases, so long as it takes its shape from them, it will remain recognizable as the
interpretation of the principles to which the nation committed itself—rather than as creations of,
or evolutions into, brand new ones.”); RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 22, at 118
(“Because of the distinction it draws between . . . Application and No-Application
Understandings, the paradigm-case approach to the meaning of [a] commitment differs sharply
from an originalist approach, which would take all of [the Framers’] original intentions as equally
conclusive.”).
74. See RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 22, at 125–26 (“Say I have committed myself
to eating no more unhealthy food. At the time I made this commitment, there was one particular
dish I meant to put off the table: chicken-fried steak. In other words, I had an original
Application Understanding that chicken-fried steak was unhealthy and that my new commitment
required me to abstain from it. . . . But science proves me wrong. Chicken-fried steak, it turns
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seems quite inadequate, and in a way that points toward the Theory of Original
Sinn as the proper response. According to Rubenfeld, in the case of a mistake
by the Framers about the facts regarding the paradigm case, we can still take
the paradigm case as foundational, “taking the facts of the [paradigm] case as
they were (mistakenly) taken at the time [of the framing].”75 But what does
this mean? One way of reading the phrase suggests that we should abandon
our disagreement with the Framers, and adhere to the paradigm case anyway.
That cannot be what Rubenfeld means. But, just as Berger faced a multiplicity
of possible modifications of the “What would the Framers do?” question,
Rubenfeld’s theory is incomplete if he means we should modify the Framers’
view of the paradigm case to some extent in order to find our fixed point. The
Theory of Original Sinn would say that we should hold as fixed, not the
paradigm case itself, but a function from possible worlds to cases which, when
added to the Framers’ view of the state of the world, would yield the Framers’
paradigm case.
The paradigm case is only as fixed as the Framers’ factual assessments are
reliable. Certainly, it would be an exceedingly odd situation in which such
widespread error infects the Framers. Those who enacted the Fourteenth
Amendment, for instance, thought it would prevent certain discriminatory
legislation in the South, the Black Codes, and there is no reason to think that
the enactors were ignorant in any relevant way about the facts that would cause
their language to be applied to prohibit the Black Codes. Were we to learn, for
instance, that a proposed interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would
not, in some way, given the facts as the Reconstruction Congress saw them,
cover the Black Codes then prevalent, it would therefore surely be a fatal
objection to that interpretation. It is simply incredible, in that context, to
imagine that the Framers were all wrong about the application and reference of
their words. But if widespread error by the Framers is possible—and it surely
is—our theoretical apparatus needs to account for those cases too.
I share Rubenfeld’s inclination to make the original referents—the original
paradigm cases—as fixed as they can be, within the constraints that possible
Framer error set for us. The way to do that, though, is to make the sense of a
provision fully fixed. If both the sense of a provision and the relevant facts
could change, then the constitutional referent would be even more malleable
out, helps build strong bodies twelve ways. . . . Doesn’t this simple example prove that
Application Understandings can be as erroneous as No-Application Understandings?”).
75. Id. at 129. “[N]otwithstanding the health-food story, there remains a sense in which
original core Application Understandings cannot be mistaken.” Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
Rubenfeld imagines that the First Amendment framers were mistaken about a paradigm case
involving John Peter Zenger. See id. at 128–29. He says that, after finding out that the Framers
were mistaken about the paradigm case, “judges can and should continue enforcing the
foundational Application Understanding, taking the facts of the Zenger case as they were
(mistakenly) taken at the time.” Id.
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than it must be, merely because of the possibility of Framer error. Maintaining
paradigm cases whenever that is possible in light of the facts means
maintaining the original sense in all circumstances. That is, Rubenfeld’s
attachment to paradigm cases, leavened with the possibility of Framer error,
should push us toward the Theory of Original Sinn. Only the text can answer
what sorts of errors should cause us to abandon adherence to the paradigm
case, for only the sense expressed in that text determines which facts are the
reference-yielding facts. The text does not merely pick out a particular
paradigm case; it does so for a reason, stated in the text, whose sense is
binding on other cases too.
Rubenfeld says that the paradigm case adds something that the text alone
lacks: the commitment was not to particular forbidden categories, but to the
tangible evils falling under those categories.76 The Theory of Original Sinn
would agree that the Fourteenth Amendment is a commitment both to its
textually expressed constitutional sense, and to its fact-dependent
constitutional referent. However, the paradigm case requires facts to hold in
order to be the paradigm case. The facts that cause the Fourteenth
Amendment’s text to refer to the Black Codes are to be adhered to because
they are true, not because they help us get to the paradigm case.
But if we really take seriously that the original sense of the constitutional
text is fixed, and that it is the true unchanging foundation both for the
paradigm case and for other cases, then we must discard an aspect of
Rubenfeld’s theory that he clearly thinks is critical: succeeding generations’
interpretive liberty to craft and enforce additional, different principles that will
cover the paradigm case.77 The Theory of Original Sinn, though, denies the
existence of that liberty. Later generations only have the liberty to assess the
state of the world: to plug the actual world into the constitutional intensional
function. The function itself is fixed beyond the ability of later interpreters to
add or subtract. As interpreters, we can only decide what to put into the
function; that is, we can decide what possible world we inhabit. But Rubenfeld

76. Id. at 134 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment is not merely a general commitment to the
equal protection of the laws, the privileges and immunities of citizens, and so on. The Fourteenth
Amendment committed the nation, at a minimum, not to tolerate black codes of the kind passed
by numerous Southern states in the wake of the Civil War. Interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment begins with this fact about its meaning. Any posited interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment that knocks out that foundational paradigm case is to be rejected for that reason
alone.”).
77. See Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 22, at 1172 (“There is a floor, but no ceiling. The
core prohibitions must be honored, but later courts are free (indeed required) to consider whether
a right also entails additional prohibitions apart from or contrary to the original understanding.
Indeed there is even a kind of internal pressure toward expansion. The judiciary’s task is to
generalize: to formulate and apply general principles or rules of application capturing the
paradigm cases.”).
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argues otherwise, insisting that we can always consider cases other than the
paradigm with no deference to the Framers.78
Rubenfeld is emphatic in rejecting an approach like that of Robert Bork,
who in defending Brown v. Board of Education explains that he aims to derive
merely a major premise from history, to be filled in with a factual minor
Rubenfeld’s cardinal principle of interpretation is that
premise.79
“constitutional provisions are not to be interpreted merely as expressions of the
democratic will of the ratifying moment, if there was such a will, whether this
will is rendered in terms of specific ‘original intentions’ or more general
‘original purposes.’”80 He therefore has denied that paradigm cases can be
understood as the Theory of Original Sinn would understand them: as the
result of inserting the Framers’ understood facts into a fixed constitutional
intensional function from facts to outcomes.81 He has rejected any sort of
fixed point that is expressed, as is the constitutional sense, in the Constitutional
text.82 Rubenfeld insists that his constitutional results do not flow from the
Framers’ use of textual expressions that they selected at the time of the
framing; they flow from our own work in developing governing principles. As
long as we retain the paradigm case, he says, that is enough security that we
have kept faith with the actual Constitution.83 Contrary to the Theory of
Original Sinn, Rubenfeld insists that adherence to the paradigm case only out
of obedience to an authoritative, unchanging Constitutional text would be
undemocratic.84

78. See RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 22, at 194 (“No matter how widely
held, no matter how intensely felt, the original understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment
permitted racial segregation deserves no interpretive deference. The foundational paradigm cases
of a constitutional right are absolute, but what else it prohibits is always a matter of interpretation,
reserved for the future to decide.”) (first and second emphases added).
79. See id. at 183. For Judge Bork’s general defense of Brown, see BORK, supra note 36, at
81–83.
80. RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 22, at 183.
81. See Rubenfeld, Moment, supra note 22, at 1107.
82. See id. (“A Justice determined to read the Constitution as written, and not as a vehicle
for popular voice, [i.e., a Justice acting as Rubenfeld would prefer] could not be an originalist—at
least not as originalism is currently understood. He could neither defer to the sum of the
Founders’ specific intentions, nor could he try, as today’s ‘soft’ originalists do, to translate into
present realities the Founders’ more general objectives and purposes, because both of these
strategies are means of interpreting the Constitution in accordance with the voice of a particular
historical moment.”).
83. See Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 22, at 1172 (“So long as interpretation takes its
shape from the paradigm cases, constitutional law will remain an interpretation of the
commitments the people undertook, even though such law neither conforms nor purports to
conform with popular will at any time in the nation’s history or future.”) (emphasis added).
84. See Rubenfeld, Fidelity, supra note 22, at 1483–84 (“[I]nterpretation cannot be wholly
reduced to the original will or intentions, for then it would have privileged a single moment of
democratic will and thereby contradicted its fundamental premise, which is that self-government
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As noted, in response to criticisms about Framer errors regarding paradigm
cases, Rubenfeld has, in his most recent work, backed away from the idea that
paradigm cases are absolutely fixed, because the Framers can get the facts that
stand between the text and the paradigm case wrong.85 But in earlier work, he
mocked the idea that we can correct the Framers’ factual errors. Defending
Brown on originalist grounds (or rather, defending originalism from the Brown
counterexample), Robert Bork suggested that “equality and segregation were
mutually inconsistent, though the [Framers] did not understand that.”86
Rubenfeld’s response is mockery.87 Now, of course, anyone can say that the
death penalty really is cruel. But showing its cruelty is an entirely different
matter. The Framers assumed three times in the Fifth Amendment that capital
punishment would be practiced: (a) in referring to “capital or otherwise
infamous crime,” (b) in referring to those put “in jeopardy of life,” and (c) in
referring to those “deprived of life . . . without due process of law.”88 Perhaps
originalists have been a little too quick in assuming that the Framers were right
in the assumption they presumably made that the capital punishment thrice
presupposed by the Fifth Amendment was consistent with the simultaneously
enacted Eighth Amendment.89 And perhaps Bork is a little too quick in
assuming that the Framers were wrong in the assumption about equality and
must never be reduced to government in accordance with the will of the governed at any
particular time.”).
85. See RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 22, at 125–27.
86. BORK, supra note 36, at 82.
87. See RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 22, at 179 (“[I]f this general-purpose
originalism rescues Brown, it surrenders all the results originalists demand elsewhere in
constitutional law. Originalists have insisted a thousand times that the Constitution was never
intended to forbid the death penalty. But a general-purpose originalist could simply say, quoting
Bork, that the death penalty and abolishing cruel and unusual punishment were ‘mutually
inconsistent, though the framers did not understand that.’ . . . Even a Marxist judge could now be
an originalist: ‘equality and [private property] were mutually inconsistent, though the framers did
not understand that’ either.”) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). The full context:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
89. But only a little bit, I think. The remaining work would require a theory of the sense
attached to “cruel and unusual” as used in the Eighth Amendment. Though I have not had the
opportunity to review the literature in any detail, here is one theory that seems plausible to me:
the Eighth Amendment bars extreme corporal punishment, that is, punishment intending to cause
a lot of pain. That is what “cruel” suggests to my mind, and I suspect it suggested the same thing
to the Framers too. However, I would need to do a bit of work to verify the point.
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segregation; certainly, a fuller explanation of exactly why they were wrong is
important (and, of course, of great use in deciding other cases). I will consider
these criticisms in more detail below. But Bork’s basic point, which
Rubenfeld disparages in a manner inconsistent with his treatment of the
chicken-fried steak counterexample, is merely that as interpreters we must
somehow be capable of identifying and taking account of Framer error. No
one but the most extreme skeptic about our ability to make sense of the world
would deny that, surely. Indeed, Rubenfeld has conceded as much in his
discussions of Framer error regarding a paradigm case.90
Rubenfeld contends that his approach to considering the possibility of
Framer error is somehow less dangerous than an approach, like the Theory of
Original Sinn, which understands the text to fix the level of generality to which
we should be unalterably attached. He says: “The higher-level-of-generality
view—emasculating the core Application Understandings—would in principle
free judges to ignore, if they chose, every constitutional provision’s
foundational paradigm cases.”91 This does not seem right at all. Only if an
interpreter makes a compelling claim of factual error can he do this; he cannot
merely “choose” to find the relevant factual error. And he has the same factfinding liberty under Rubenfeld’s views. We can make factual mistakes today,
to be sure, but as long as we allow the theoretical possibility of Framer error,
as Rubenfeld now does, it is simply impossible to make our paradigm cases
any firmer than the reference-yielding facts. Only by “emasculating” the
reference-yielding facts can we emasculate the core paradigm cases. Our quest
for certainty may be fruitless, but I would regard our ability to assess facts as
sufficiently sturdy to give us the security we crave against constitutional
erosion. Even on Rubenfeld’s theory, though, that ability to assess facts is an
essential part of all the security we have.
The relative reliability of Framers’ assessments of facts, on which the
Theory of Original Sinn says that the stability of paradigm cases rests, explains
a fundamental fact on which Rubenfeld relies: the fact that “intentions to
permit”—i.e., Framer expectations about what their provision would not do—
are not given the attention and deference given to “intentions to prohibit”—i.e.,
Framer expectations about what their provision would do.92 A simple reason
for that disparity is available to the Theory of Original Sinn: the fact that the
90. RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 22, at 125–27.
91. Id. at 134.
92. Rubenfeld, Reading, supra note 22, at 1171 (“Interpretation of constitutional guarantees
[of rights] on the model of writing takes its shape from what the Founders understood these
guarantees centrally to forbid; it accords little or no deference to what they intended them to
permit.”); id. at 1172 (“[D]istinguishing between intent-to-prohibit and intent-to-permit . . .
introduces an interpretive asymmetry favoring expansion. There is a floor, but no ceiling. The
core prohibitions must be honored, but later courts are free (indeed required) to consider whether
a right also entails additional prohibitions apart from or contrary to the original understanding.”).
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Framers were more reliable in their factual assessments of motivating cases
simply because they thought more extensively about them than they did about
expected areas of non-application. Courts’ unconsidered dicta are less
persuasive than holdings, precisely because they are less carefully considered.
Likewise, what the Framers thought about whether the Fourteenth Amendment
would apply to prohibit explicit racial disparities in the availability of contract
law is worthy of great, even conclusive, deference. But what the Framers
thought about whether the Fourteenth Amendment would apply, say, to protect
the free speech rights of corporations against state interference is less
obviously binding on us—simply because the Framers were less obviously
right about the facts that would, together with the sense of their language, yield
the constitutional referent in that case.
Rubenfeld is right that there is a distinction between intentions to prohibit,
which motivated a prohibition, and intentions to permit, which did not. But he
is incorrect to declare confidently the inability of other theories to
accommodate the distinction, and he is also mistaken to draw the distinction so
sharply, to an extent that he unduly disparages the Framers’ views about what
lay outside the constitutional referent. Just as the distinction between holding
and dicta explains why intentions to permit have lesser weight, it explains why
they should have some weight: the weight of dicta. “Considered dicta” are
properly given substantial, even controlling, weight,93 and we should likewise

93. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998) (“The great body
of this case law supports, either by holding or considered dicta, the position that the privilege
does survive in a case such as the present one.”); Covington v. Cont’l Gen. Tire, 381 F.3d 216,
218 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In carrying out that task [of predicting state law], we must consider relevant
state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable
data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue at
hand.”) (quoting Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir. 1993)); Kennedy
Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 738 (8th Cir. 2004) (prediction of state law looks at
“related state court precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, and other reliable sources”)
(quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 215 F.3d 830, 840 (8th Cir. 2000)); McCleod v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 618, 628 (3rd Cir. 2004) (“While this statement is
dicta, it was considered dicta, which we find persuasive.”); McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life
Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “we have often stated, ‘[w]e do not
treat considered dicta from the Supreme Court lightly,’” but “treat such dicta with ‘due
deference’”) (quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc)); Johnson v. Life Investors’ Ins. Co. of Am., 98 Fed. Appx. 814, 819 (10th Cir.
2004) (“[I]n making a prognostication of what the highest state court will decide, the decisions of
lower state courts and other federal courts are of ‘somewhat less importance’ than even
considered dicta by the state’s ‘highest court.’”) (quoting Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570,
580 (10th Cir. 1989)); Rossiter v. Potter, 357 F.3d 26, 31 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[F]ederal appellate
courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s
outright holdings . . . .”) (quoting McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991));
United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Carefully considered statements of the
Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, must be accorded great weight and should be treated

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

590

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:555

treat with deference carefully reasoned opinions about what a constitutional
provision would not cover.
VI. FALLON AND CONSTITUTIONAL MODES
Richard Fallon’s theory considers modes of constitutional discourse
pertaining to (1) the constitutional text, (2) the intent of the constitutional
Framers, (3) constitutional theory, (4) judicial precedent, and (5) justice or
social policy.94 He sets as his aim “show[ing] how arguments of these various
kinds fit together in a single, coherent constitutional calculus.”95 His answer is
to aim for coherence among the modes, and rank them hierarchically when that
is impossible.96
I think, however, that the Theory of Original Sinn can accommodate the
reconciliation that Fallon seeks more simply and without the undesirable
rigidity of his theory. I build on my comments about how to approach and
evaluate the Framers’ views on paradigm and peripheral cases: the same thing
can be said of anyone’s assessment of the constitutional referent. To determine
how worthy an interpreter’s assessment of constitutional reference is of
deference, we should consider (a) the extent to which the interpreter is likely to
have properly grasped the constitutional sense, and (b) the extent to which the
interpreter is likely to be right about the constitutional-reference-yielding facts.
We should then assimilate Framers’ and later interpreters’ judgments of
constitutional reference, and we should evaluate both sorts of judgment
according to these same two criteria. Indeed, we should also evaluate nonjudicial, or non-federal, or non-governmental, assessments of reference by the

as authoritative when, as in this instance, badges of reliability abound. . . . ‘[F]ederal appellate
courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s
outright holdings . . . .’”) (quoting McCoy, 950 F.2d at 13, 19); Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co.,
68 P.3d 936, 945 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) (“To the extent the statement is considered dicta, we have
been admonished to give such dicta ‘adequate deference and not disregard it summarily.’”)
(quoting State v. Johnson, 15 P.3d 1233, 1239 (N.M. 2000)).
94. Fallon, supra note 23, at 1189–90. For a similar approach, see BOBBITT, supra note 23.
95. Id. at 1190.
96. Id. at 1286.
The solution, which I call constructive coherence theory, has two aspects. The first
relies on the central conceptual idea of constructivist coherence: the notion that the
various types of argument function not autonomously but interactively. The constructivist
coherence approach assumes that, even when a tentative assessment of arguments within
various categories suggests a conflict among prescribed results, the balance of competing
arguments frequently can be reconsidered in a successful effort to achieve a uniform
prescription. Sometimes, however, the strongest arguments within the different categories
will point irreversibly to different conclusions. In such cases, the theory’s second aspect
comes into play. The implicit norms of our constitutional practice, I have argued, require
that the claims of the different kinds of arguments be ranked hierarchically.
Id.
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same criteria. The Theory of Original Sinn includes only two modes of
interpretive constitutional discourse, separated by a distinction that, while not
completely free from doubt or criticism, has proven itself against extended
philosophical scrutiny. On the one hand is the constitutional sense, which
should be unchanging and fixed at the framing. But on the other hand is a
tradition of assessments of constitutional reference, all of which can be seen as
essentially the same mode.
Both original history and precedent represent assessments of reference.
Rather than establishing a hierarchy and preferring one mode over the other in
cases of conflict, we should recognize that it is possible for either of them to
trump the other in an appropriate case. Sometimes the Framers get the
reference-yielding facts wrong, and later interpreters get it right, but sometimes
later interpreters make errors that the Framers avoided. According to Fallon’s
hierarchy, if the views of Framers and later interpreters on the constitutional
referent are irreconcilable, we should always and everywhere prefer the
Framers.97 But cases of Framer error discussed above show why that cannot
be right.
Furthermore, recognizing this parity of Framers and courts in the
assessment of reference can allow us to expand the category so that it is not so
focused on the Supreme Court. The presumption of constitutionality, for
instance, represents deference to legislative assessments of constitutional
reference. Lower court decisions, state court interpretations of parallel
provisions, and non-governmental materials like law reviews and treatises can
be helpful for the same reasons that precedent and the Framers’ expectations
are useful: they represent the views of those with an ability to grasp
constitutional sense and make judgments about reference-yielding facts about
the world.
All of these sources should receive the same treatment: they are all
persuasive but defeasible indications of the constitutional referent. All earlier
assessments of constitutional reference deserve the sort of deference the
Supreme Court described (referring to certain agency decisions) in Skidmore. I
quoted the critical language above, but let me repeat it here for convenience.
Such assessments of constitutional reference,
while not controlling upon [later interpreters of the Constitution] by reason of
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which [later interpreters] may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such
a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and

97. See id. at 1193–94.
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later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.98

Indeed, it is not difficult to find expressions of exactly this Skidmore-style
attitude—persuasive, but defeasible—toward various assessments of
constitutional reference.
For judicial precedent, consider Payne v. Tennessee: “Stare decisis is the
preferred course,” the Court says, but is not constraining “when governing
decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned,” and it “is not an inexorable
command . . . . This is particularly true in constitutional cases.”99
For original intentions as expressed, for instance, in the Federalist,
consider McCulloch v. Maryland:
In the course of the argument, the Federalist has been quoted; and the
opinions expressed by the authors of that work have been justly supposed to be
entitled to great respect in expounding the constitution. No tribute can be paid
to them which exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions to the cases
which may arise in the progress of our government, a right to judge of their
correctness must be retained; and, to understand the argument, we must
examine the proposition it maintains, and the objections against which it is
directed.100

For legislative interpretations, consider Myers v. United States: “We have
devoted much space to this discussion and decision of the question of the
Presidential power of removal in the First Congress, not because a
Congressional conclusion on a constitutional issue is conclusive, but, first
because of our agreement with the reasons upon which it was avowedly
based . . . .”101

98. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (setting a standard for deference to
agencies’ statutory interpretations when a statute does not delegate authority to the agency). On
Skidmore deference as a model for constitutional interpretation, see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra
note 35, at 1149 & n.129 (referring to Skidmore in explaining the relevance of sources of
evidence of constitutional meaning that are “certainly relevant and possibly persuasive sources of
constitutional meaning, but that . . . are not authoritative and hence not conclusive. They are
evidence of meaning; they are not constitutive of meaning, and hence binding determinations of
meaning in their own right.”).
99. 501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991).
100. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819); cf. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of
The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1998) (“[T]he
principled textualist must also ask whether a given essay, examined in light of all the surrounding
contextual evidence, offers a persuasive account of likely constitutional meaning. To borrow
from another context, when a textualist judge relies on The Federalist in constitutional
adjudication, he or she must give serious attention to ‘the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’” (quoting
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140)).
101. 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926).
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For all of these examples of earlier interpreters’ assessments of
constitutional reference, then, we must retain, in the words of McCulloch, a
“right to judge of their correctness.”102 But the same, of course, cannot be said
regarding the sense, intension, or connotation of our constitutional provisions.
In our role as interpreters of a constitutional provision that already exists, has
already been enacted, and to which we may already have swown allegiance,
we do not retain the right to judge of the correctness of the rules expressed by
the provision itself.
Fallon’s “policy” and “theory” modes are most usefully thought of the
same way. Given that the Framers and we are part of the same tradition of
moral and political thought, our own normative judgments about what the
constitutional outcome should be, or about what would fit best with the
theoretical or structural concerns of the Constitution, are defeasible indications
of what sorts of outcomes a constitutional provision would be likely to
produce. If an outcome seems undesirable, odd, or unattractive to us, we have
reason to believe that it would have seemed undesirable or odd or unattractive
to the Framers, and so reason to believe that it does not fit with the unchanging
sense, applied to the facts about the world. Of course, that reason is defeasible,
like all other explicit or implicit judgments about constitutional reference.
VII. APPLICATION: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND RACIALLY
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
How would the Theory of Original Sinn apply to the often-discussed
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids racially segregated
schools? In this section, I will consider what Berger, Rubenfeld, and Fallon
have themselves said about Brown v. Board of Education.103 Berger criticizes
Brown, while Rubenfeld and Fallon defend it. I will argue that the Theory of
Original Sinn can both accommodate the evidence that Berger uses to criticize
Brown and do a better job of supplying a positive normative foundation for
Brown than can Rubenfeld’s or Fallon’s theories. I will pay particular
attention to Michael McConnell’s originalist argument for Brown based on the
debates preceding the Civil Rights Act of 1875,104 and explain how the Theory
of Original Sinn would use that sort of evidence in a somewhat different way
than McConnell does.

102. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 433.
103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
104. See McConnell, supra note 24. I should point out that Michael Klarman, who has
criticized McConnell, uses an implausible version of originalism, very different from the Theory
of Original Sinn. See Klarman, supra note 70.
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Brown on History

Let me first clarify exactly what the Supreme Court itself said about
history in Brown; its statements are not so contrary to the Theory of Original
Sinn as they might seem at first. The Supreme Court’s departure from history
in Brown, combined with the Court’s eventual vindication in the minds of most
morally sensible observers, has given great encouragement to critics of
originalism. The Court noted famously,
In approaching this problem, [i.e., the problem “whether Plessy v.
Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education”] we cannot turn the
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout
the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public
schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.105

The Theory of Original Sinn would agree that we must consider the actual
facts of the world—that is, the world of today—in order to determine the
actual constitutional referent. But we are obligated to turn back the clock if we
are to be sure that we have properly captured the sense of “the equal protection
of the laws” and the other textual expressions in the Fourteenth Amendment.
We cannot turn the clock back on reference, but we must on sense.
The Theory of Original Sinn, applied to the issue of school segregation,
would delve into historical materials with the initial aim of extracting the
original sense. That is, the theory aims to ask of the Framers concerning their
tangible conclusions why they came to the conclusions they did. What was the
textual argument for their conclusions? The Framers, qua Framers, could not
be wrong about the constitutional sense, but they could be wrong about the
constitutional referent. We must therefore look for reasons for their assertions
about constitutional reference. If a Framer says that the Fourteenth
Amendment would or would not affect school segregation, we cannot simply
defer to his conclusion, but must find out why he thought so. The Framers, as
enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment, have brute legal authority to explain
the sense of the constitutional language—that language is, after all, their
language, and is used on a particular occasion of their choosing. But they must
explain themselves regarding particular instances. To be fully perspicuous and
persuasive to later interpreters, Framers must show how the sense of their
words, plus the facts of the world, produce the particular outcomes they expect.
Insofar as Framers do not do this all the time, we may have a puzzle about
trying to work backward from particular instances to the text in order to figure
out what sense they attached to their language. Concerning these referents,
even those assessed by Framers, we must keep in mind our Skidmore-

105. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93.
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McCulloch-Myers-Payne rights and responsibilities—“a right to judge of their
correctness must be retained,”106 while we reject instances that are “badly
reasoned,”107 and attend to “the thoroughness evident in [their]
consideration”108 and “the validity of [their] reasoning”109 to see if we have
“agreement with the reasons” of the Framers.110
It is important to recall exactly what sort of historical evidence the Court in
Brown did not consider dispositive, so that we can understand what version of
originalism, if any, it may have rejected. The Court in Brown posed a very
specific question for reargument in its Order of June 8, 1953: “What evidence
is there that the Congress which submitted and the State legislatures and
conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not
contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish
segregation in public schools?”111 Note that the Brown Court did not ask
exactly the chief question that the Theory of Original Sinn would ask. The
chief historical question for the Theory of Original Sinn is “What sense did the
Framers believe that the constitutional language expressed?” The Framers’
understandings about the application of that language to specific cases are
relevant, insofar as (a) we can attempt to work backward from original
reference to original sense by taking into account the original assessment of
facts and (b) the Framers’ assessments of facts may be worthy of deference,
but in no case are they dispositive. In considering only what specific
applications the Framers contemplated that the Fourteenth Amendment would
have, and rejecting that sort of evidence as dispositive, Brown is only rejecting
Berger’s WWFD brand of originalism, not the Theory of Original Sinn.
The second question posed by the Court in 1953 is closer to what the
Theory of Original Sinn would consider, but it is still not exactly the same.
The Court asked,
If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the
Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the
immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the
understanding of the Framers of the Amendment (a) that future Congresses
might, in the exercise of their power under section 5 of the Amendment,
abolish such segregation, or (b) that it would be within the judicial power, in
light of future conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such
segregation of its own force?112

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 433.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Id.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
Id.
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What is important is not so much whether Framers in 1868 considered
particular then-counterfactuals—though that sort of evidence would be
persuasive—but the manner in which the Framers believed that their language
would operate on the facts in general. That is, the Framers could be wrong
about then-present conditions, and they could be wrong about then-future
conditions as well. The archeologist of Sinn is bound neither by what facts the
Framers thought did obtain, nor by what facts the Framers thought would
obtain in the future. We as interpreters are only bound by the actual facts and
the Framers’ use of constitutional language to express a function from the facts
to outcomes.
B.

Who are the Framers?

Some critics of originalism suggest that originalism has a particular sort of
trouble in identifying which people’s opinions in 1868 should count;113
because the Amendment was enacted in a process involving a Congress with
many members and multiple state ratifying conventions, it is impossible to say
whose intentions should count. I cannot here do justice to the problems of
corporate meaning, but I will say three things.
First, any theory that places any relevance on what “the Framers” thought
about an issue must make sense of who counts as “the Framers.” Those
theories—and Berger’s, Rubenfeld’s, and Fallon’s theories certainly are among
these—must also answer these questions. So the problem of corporate intent is
not any reason to prefer their theories to mine.114
Second, the process of making contracts, legislating, judging on multimember courts, and innumerable other well-established legal phenomena
presuppose that meaning can be shared by more than one person: that is, that
two or more people can share an intention and thus speak corporately.
Skepticism about group meaning would doom far more than particular theories
about the Constitution, and we should therefore think it deeply implausible.
Third, I would gesture toward the law of agency and corporations as a way
of understanding the verbal intentions of groups. It seems to me that “The
People” as a sovereign agent is a legal fiction just like a corporation. Finding
out its mental states should therefore be no more or less difficult than assessing
the mental states of a corporation. That may be hard, but it is certainly not
impossible or conceptually confused. Corporations of course act only through
agents, and a corporation is charged with the mental states of agents acting in

113. John Denvir, The New Constitutional Law, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 139, 140 n.8 (1983)
(reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982))
(“Who are the ‘framers’? Did the framers have any unitary ‘intent’?”).
114. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Of Constitutional Self-Government, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1749, 1760 (2003) (“Yes, I am assuming that a people can act collectively—that there is such a
thing as rational, purposive collective decision-making.”).
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the scope of their employment. To assess the extent to which an individual
representative or ratifier’s beliefs or intentions represent the beliefs or
intentions of The People, we must assess the extent to which an individual
person is acting as the authorized agent of the sovereign people.115
I cannot settle these rules in detail; they would require a careful analysis of
how agency principles apply to the constitution-amending process. However,
it seems best that constitutional language should be judged according to how a
hypothetical reasonable member of the public would understand it. The fact
that the Constitution, in becoming law, passed through a critical public gap
between Congress and the state ratifiers suggests that hypothetical reasonable
members of the public should be our focus. Congress approved the
constitutional language and set it forth publicly, prior to its becoming law, to
the ratifying states for their consideration and legal authorization. Because, at
this point, no individual ratifying body was critical to the enactment of the
amendment, no individual ratifier’s understanding should be controlling:
rather, the public meaning as assessed by a hypothetical reasonable ratifier
counts. And, of course, to repeat my theory, it is the sense of the provision, as
grasped by a hypothetical reasonable ratifier, that is the unchanging
constitutional touchstone. Originally understood referents of the actual
ratifiers and originally understood referents of the Congressional Framers are
relevant both (a) as a source from which, by working backwards, we can
extract the original sense as grasped by a hypothetical reasonable ratifier and
(b) as persuasive but defeasible sources of assessments of constitutional
reference.
C. Berger on Brown
Berger relies chiefly on (a) James Wilson’s statement that education was
excluded from an early version of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s predecessor; (b) Northern negrophobia, which made the
abolition of racial segregation unthinkable; (c) silence on school segregation
during the ratification; and (d) congressional segregation of the D.C.
schools.116 In short, none of these actions were sufficiently explained to be
decisive evidence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, particularly in
light of other evidence indicating at least the presence of serious cognitive
dissonance in the enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given particularly
the Republican push to desegregate the schools under the Fourteenth
Amendment just a few years later, the Framers seemed manifestly capable “of

115. For a different approach to corporate intentions, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, THE
RULE OF RULES, supra note 36, at 119 (arguing that if no intention commands a majority, a rule
should have no effect), and Alexander, All or Nothing at All?, supra note 36, at 387–88 (same).
116. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The “Original Intent”—As Perceived by Michael McConnell, 91
NW. U. L. Rev. 242 (1996).
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asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting.”117
McConnell gives excellent evidence that the best interpretation of those
principles is to be one which would desegregate the schools. If we are to defer
to such Brown-supporting Republican theories of the Fourteenth Amendment,
though, there are lessons, however, particularly regarding the resurrection of
the Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, which we should take
much more seriously.
I will first consider the affirmative evidence that the historical sense of the
Fourteenth Amendment, when combined with the actual facts, would prohibit
segregation in public schools.
Charles Sumner gave numerous explanations, shortly after the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted, why he thought that the racial segregation of public
schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment.118 His argument was simple: (a)
the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the racial abridgement of the rights
belonging to citizens, and (b) segregation of public institutions was a racial
abridgement of the rights of citizens, because segregation requires that they
exercise their rights subject to a stamp of inferiority. I will briefly present his
explanation from January 1872. His proposed bill, initially offered as an
amendment to an amnesty measure, provided for “equal and impartial
enjoyment” of common-carrier rights by “all citizens of the United States.”119
Sumner began by invoking “equal rights promised by a just citizenship.”120

117. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857).
118. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1872).
119. Specifically, the bill provided:
That all citizens of the United States, without distinction of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, are entitled to the equal and impartial enjoyment of any
accommodation, advantage, facility, or privilege furnished by common carriers, whether
on land or water; by inn keepers; by licensed owners, managers, or lessees of theaters or
other places of public amusement; by trustees, commissioners, superintendents, teachers,
or other officers of common schools and other public institutions of learning, the same
being supported by moneys derived from general taxation or authorized by law; by
trustees or officers of church organizations, cemetery associations, and benevolent
institutions incorporated by national or State authority; and this right shall not be denied
or abridged on any pretense of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Id.
120. See id.
Mr. President, slavery, in its original pretension, reappears in the present debate.
Again the barbarous tyranny stalks into this Chamber, denying to a whole race the equal
rights promised by a just citizenship.
....
The precise rule is Equality before the Law; nor more nor less; that is, that condition
before the Law in which all are alike—being entitled without any discrimination to the
equal enjoyment of all institutions, privileges, advantages, and conveniences created or
regulated by law . . . .
Id.
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Sumner considered at length the distinction between social and civil rights,
insisting that the equality pertaining to citizenship—that is, equality of civil
rights—was enough to support his bill.121 In support of his inclusion of
transportation on common carriers and in schools within civil rights, rather
than within social rights, Sumner argued at length from a number of legal
treatises regarding the traditional rights to use common carriers.122 He argued
for the same conclusion regarding theaters and schools. He said of the
“common school” that it is on a par with common carriers.123
Sumner also argued at length that legally enforced separation was a
relevant inequality—a relevant abridgement of the rights of citizens. To be
required to enjoy civil rights while being kept away from the dominant race
with a stamp of inferiority is not to enjoy such civil rights fully.124

121. See id. at 382.
There is no colored person who does not resent the imputation that he is seeking to intrude
himself socially anywhere. This is no question of society; no question of social life; no
question of social equality, if anybody knows what this means. The object is simply
Equality before the law, a term which explains itself. . . . [N]obody pretends that Equality
in the highway, whether on pavement or sidewalk, is a question of society. And, permit
me to say, that Equality in all institutions created or regulated by law, is as little a
question of society.
Id.
122. Id. at 383.
The inn is a public institution, with well-known rights and duties. Among the latter is the
duty to receive all paying travelers decent in appearance and conduct, wherein it is
distinguished from a lodging-house or boarding-house, which is a private concern, and not
subject to the obligations of the inn.
Id.
123. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. at 384.
Much is implied in this term, according to which the school harmonizes with the other
institutions already mentioned. It is an inn where children rest on the road to knowledge.
It is a public conveyance where children are passengers. It is a theater where children
resort for enduring recreation. Like the others, it assumes to provide for the public;
therefore it must be open to all; nor can there be any exclusion, except on grounds equally
applicable to the inn, the public conveyance, and the theater.
Id.
124. Id. at 382–83.
Then comes the other excuse, which finds Equality in separation. Separate hotels,
separate conveyances, separate theaters, separate schools, separate institutions of learning
and science, separate churches, and separate cemeteries—these are the artificial
substitutes for Equality; and this is the contrivance by which a transcendent right,
involving a transcendent duty, is evaded; for Equality is not only a right but a duty.
How vain to argue that there is no denial of Equal Rights when this separation is
enforced. The substitute is invariably an inferior article. Does any Senator deny it?
Therefore, it is not Equality. . . .
Assuming what is most absurd to assume, and what is contradicted by all experience,
that a substitute can be an equivalent, it is so in form only and not in reality. Every such
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As McConnell points out, the Republicans like Sumner were far from
alone in distinguishing segregated enjoyment of a privilege from full
enjoyment.125 Railroad Co. v. Brown,126 decided by the Supreme Court in
1873, construed an 1863 provision concerning railroad cars, “[t]hat no person
shall be excluded from the cars on account of color.”127 The Supreme Court
called the provision of separate cars “an ingenious attempt to evade a
compliance with the obvious meaning of the requirement.”128
Equality in civil rights, or equality of the rights of citizens, was the
constitutional touchstone for Sumner: “It cannot be said, according to its title,
[i.e., the title of the Civil Rights Act of 1866] that all persons are protected in
their civil rights, so long as the outrages I expose continue to exist; nor is
Slavery entirely dead.”129 In line with the language of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause—“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”130—he
argued, “Our rights are his rights; our equality is his equality; our privileges
and immunities are his great possession.”131 Senator Sherman explained a
similar theory of privileges and immunities as those privileges that, in general,
historically characterize citizenship.132 Senator Carpenter explained his
attempt is an indignity to the colored race, instinct with the spirit of Slavery, and this
decides its character. . . .
In arraigning this attempt at separation as a Caste, I say nothing new. For years I
have denounced it as such, and here I followed good authorities, as well as reason. . . .
The principle of separation on the ground of hereditary inferiority is the distinctive
essence of Caste; but this is the outrage which lifts itself in our country, crying out, “I am
better than thou, because I am white. Get away!”
Id.
125. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 953.
126. R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873).
127. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 110, § 1, 12 Stat. 805, 805 (1863).
128. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 452.
129. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1872).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. at 385. The full context of the statement is:
Ceasing to be a slave the former victim has become not only a man, but a citizen,
admitted alike within the pale of humanity and within the pale of citizenship. As a man
he is entitled to all the rights of man, and as a citizen he becomes a member of our
common household with equality as the prevailing law. . . . Our rights are his rights; our
equality is his equality; our privileges and immunities are his great possession. To enjoy
this citizenship, people from afar, various in race and complexion, seek our shores, losing
here all distinctions of birth, as, into the ocean all rivers flow, losing all trace of origin or
color, and there is but one uniform expanse of water where each particle is like every
other particle and all are subject to the same law. In this citizenship the African is now
absorbed.
Id.
132. Id. at 843.
The fourteenth amendment . . . says:
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as hinging on “the privileges and
immunities which belong to a citizen as such, and which under that section the
State cannot abridge.”133
These arguments represent a simple, compelling interpretation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause: it forbids the denial of the privileges and
immunities generally characteristic of citizenship, like those of the common
law, on racial grounds. Racially based denial of such privileges is
“abridgement,” and segregation is the racially based denial of such privileges
because it imparts a brand of inferiority. Sumner may go a bit too far in his
definition of public institutions as including those, such as churches, that are
merely regulated by the law, as opposed to those, like common carriers or
schools, duty-bound to serve the public. But the basic explanation of the
unconstitutionality of racial public-school segregation and the segregation of
common carriers fits well with the language of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause in light of its context. An intermediate “no-caste” principle fits well
with Sumner’s invocation of the equality of the rights of citizens, based on the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While it is true that the Supreme Court disagreed with this theory of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases,134 that decision
seems plainly wrong, for reasons adequately canvassed by others. It is not at
all controversial that understanding the original sense of the Fourteenth
Amendment begins by seeing that the Supreme Court was wrong in
Slaughterhouse. “Legal scholars agree on little beyond the conclusion that the
[Privileges and Immunities] Clause does not mean what the Court said it meant
in 1873.”135
It is useful to compare Sumner and his allies’ textual reasoning with those
principles that some have thought provide a better support for Brown, such as
Strauder v. West Virginia136 and Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy.137 Despite
the fact that they appear after Slaughterhouse, the arguments of Strauder and
Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent are, like the arguments of Senator Sumner and
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.”
What are those privileges and immunities? Are they only those defined in the
Constitution, the rights secured by the amendments? Not at all. The great fountain-head,
the great reservoir of the rights of an American citizen is in the common law, the old
charters that were wrenched by our ancestors five hundred years ago and two hundred
years ago from English kings. Our rights are not limited to those given by the
Constitution. . . . You must go to the common law for them . . . .
Id.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552–64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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his allies, infused with the notion of the rights of citizenship; they seem to be
infected with the ghost of the Slaughterhouse dissents.138 A fully resurrected
Privileges and Immunities Clause, in line with the original sense of that
provision and with Senator Sumner’s arguments against the constitutionality of
school segregation, would provide much more powerful normative support for
these intermediate principles, and thus for Brown, than can current doctrine to
the extent that it rests only on the perceived wisdom of those principles in the
eyes of present courts.
Strauder, while it ultimately roots its holding in the Equal Protection
Clause, bases its rhetoric and reasoning on the privileges of citizenship. It
states the question presented, not in terms of the equal protection of persons,
but in terms of the rights of citizens of the United States: the first question is:
“whether, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, every citizen of the
United States has a right to a trial of an indictment against him by a jury
selected and impanelled without discrimination against his race or color,
because of race or color?”139 The equality of civil rights and the rights of
citizenship inform its crucial reasoning.140 The Strauder court quoted and
glossed the Privileges and Immunities Clause before its critical argument that
the Fourteenth Amendment required the equality of “civil society.”141 The key
138. Lochner and other substantive due process cases in fact trace an even more direct lineage
from the Slaughterhouse dissents. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), relies on
Allgeyer v. Lousiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897), which in turn relies on Justice Bradley’s
exposition of the “civil liberty of the citizen” in Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111
U.S. 746, 764 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring), which in turn relies on Bradley’s dissent in
Slaughterhouse.
139. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added).
140. See id. at 306–07.
It was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and
adopted. It was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights
that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of
the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States. It
not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons of color, but it denied
to any State the power to withhold from them the equal protection of the laws, and
authorized Congress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation.
Id. (emphases added).
141. See id. at 307–08.
[The Fourteenth Amendment] ordains that no State shall make or enforce any laws which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States (evidently
referring to the newly made citizens, who, being citizens of the United States, are declared
to be also citizens of the State in which they reside). It ordains that no State shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that the
law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether
colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the
colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the
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term of Strauder—“legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil
society”142—fits much better with the language of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, which speaks of the abridgement of the privileges of
citizens, than it does with equal protection.
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy is also suffused with the language of
citizenship and civil equality.143 The “equality of rights which pertains to
citizenship” is the key, again in line with the language of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, not the equal protection of persons. After discussing the
Thirteenth Amendment and then quoting the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
among others, he stated, “These two amendments, if enforced according to
their true intent and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to
freedom and citizenship.”144 His famous conclusion lays great stress on
citizenship, not equal protection.145

amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,—the right to exemption
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,—exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their
enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.
Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 308.
143. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554–55.
In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States
does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be
protected in the enjoyment of such rights. . . . But I deny that any legislative body or
judicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those
citizens are involved. Indeed, such legislation, as that here in question, is inconsistent not
only with that equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, National and State, but with
the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 555.
145. See id. at 559.
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to
be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land,
has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by
citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
Id. (emphases added). Justice Harlan concludes, again stressing the rights of citizenship, “The
sure guarantee of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional
recognition by our governments, National and State, of every right that inheres in civil freedom,
and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the United States, without regard to race.” Id.
at 560 (emphasis added).
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Parenthetically, while I cannot pursue the matter in detail, the arguments
based upon privileges and immunities seem better suited than the Equal
Protection Clause to support the desegregation of schools, because I am
inclined to agree with those commentators such as Jacobus tenBroek,146 Alfred
Avins,147 Earl Maltz,148 and John Harrison,149 who offer strong evidence
suggesting that the original sense of the Equal Protection Clause makes it
chiefly an entitlement to protection—that is, the security of person and
property—rather than the absence of discrimination. There is good reason to
think that the mandate “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,”150 rather than broadly forbidding
purposeful discrimination, establishes the reciprocal duty of government to
protect all those who must obey its decrees—that is, all those within its
jurisdiction, or its speaking of the law. Only after the Slaughterhouse mistake
were the broader purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause imported
into the Equal Protection Clause and an affirmative right to protection
neglected. A suitably resurrected constitutional right to protection would have
important implications for issues regarding the role of the state in preventing
private violence,151 racial disparities in the provision of police services,152
racial discrimination by criminal defendants in challenging jurors,153 and the
lower rate of executions of those who kill black victims.154 I will therefore
focus on the argument from the standpoint of the privileges and immunities of
citizens.
According to the Theory of Original Sinn, we should set the arguments of
Sumner and his congressional allies—who, as McConnell shows, repeatedly
garnered congressional majorities, though not filibuster-proof supermajorities,
for their views—beside the arguments for contrary conclusions. As I have
emphasized repeatedly, a contrary original understanding of the referent of the
constitutional expressions is only as strong as its supporting textual arguments;
we must retain under Skidmore, McCulloch, Myers, and Payne the right and
146. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 122 (rev. ed., Collier Books 1965) (1951).
147. Alfred Avins, The Equal “Protection” of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12
N.Y.L. FORUM 385, 425, 426 (1966).
148. See generally Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws—A Historical
Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499 (1985).
149. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385,
1433–51 (1992).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
151. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). From
last term, see Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 2808 (2005).
152. See Alfred Avins, Equal Protection Against Unnecessary Police Violence and the
Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment, 19 BUFF. L. REV. 599, 601
(1970).
153. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
154. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
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duty to judge their correctness. When we use our Skidmore, McCulloch,
Myers, and Payne rules, the arguments of Sumner and his allies have a critical
advantage, for the simple reason that their conclusions are reasoned. It is not
at all obvious what reasoning may or may not have led citizens in 1868 to think
that the text they ratified did not affect racial segregation of public schools. On
the other hand, Sumner’s arguments in January 1872 that segregation enforces
through its understood meaning a limitation on the rights of citizens, thereby
abridging their privileges and immunities in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, are strong and fit with common sense. The fact that Sumner
could make such arguments, shortly after the adoption of the Amendment and
unhindered by the wrong turn in Slaughterhouse, make them a powerful
indication of the proper referent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s language:
they are quite likely to (a) grasp its sense properly, and (b) have the facts right.
While other sources, such as Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent and Strauder, are
also persuasive, Sumner is particularly so, because he was himself a Framer,
because he gave considerable attention to the relationship of his views to the
categories expressed in the constitutional text, and because he was unburdened
with any obligation to fit with Slaughterhouse.
Congressional Democratic opponents, however, did provide a specific
explanation for their contrary conclusions about the constitutionality of
segregation. McConnell explains well how their two chief arguments were
contradictory.155 On the one hand, they argued that segregation was formally
equal; it gave each group the same rights to travel or to be educated.156 On the
other, they argued that desegregation regarding common carriers and schools
would force social equality, not merely civil equality.157 But the argument for
a right to social inequality assumed that separation was indeed, as Sumner
explained so simply, an expression of inequality, by telling inferiors to keep
away. What the Democratic arguments favored was, in effect, the free
expression of social inequality within the realm of civil rights. Public streets,
common carriers, and schools are simultaneously a social and a civic sphere.
Those exercising their civil rights regarding common carriers or schools are
not isolated from social relations more generally, and neither can social
relations be isolated from the relations among those exercising their civil
rights. In conceding that school segregation expressed social inequalities, the
155. McConnell, supra note 24, at 1016 (“[T]his argument [that desegregation involved social
rights, not merely civil rights] contradicted the opposition’s other argument: that segregation does
not constitute inequality and is equally desirable for both races. Democrats were in the awkward
position of arguing that segregation does not impart a social meaning of inequality, and that the
inequality it imparts is merely social.”).
156. See id. at 1006–14 (discussing Democratic arguments on formal equality and the lack of
a social meaning of inequality).
157. See id. at 1014–23 (discussing Democratic arguments on the distinction between social
and civil rights).
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Democrats conceded the key premise regarding whether it also expressed
inequalities in civil rights. On the assumption that there is an overlap,
segregation can do both at once. Put another way, Democrats did not argue
persuasively that segregation in schools or common carriers enforced merely
social inequality, rather than also inequality in the enjoyment of civil rights.
In conceding that they wanted to enforce social inequality, but by failing to
argue convincingly that civil rights were not at issue, Democrats undermined
arguments that formal equality was enough and that there was no brand of
inferiority at issue with segregation.158
Democratic arguments for the constitutionality of segregation in the
debates leading to the Civil Rights Act may have flushed out different
explanations for that position that may have been tacitly accepted at the time of
ratification itself. To the extent that they do, they help show us what sorts of
reference-yielding facts are at issue, and give us the means to explain how the
ratifiers may have been wrong.
The Democratic opposition to the
desegregation bill generally agreed that inequality with regard to civil rights
It also offered poor,
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.159
contradictory reasons to think either that segregation would not impose an
unequal brand of inferiority or that only social inequality was at issue. As
McConnell puts the point, “[T]he opponents of [Sumner’s] measures could not
agree on any particular constitutional theory under which segregation could be
defended as lawful.”160
Let me, then, review the evidence that Berger presents for his belief that
the Framers thought the Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid racial
segregation of public schools to see the extent to which it should push us
toward that conclusion ourselves.
Senator James Wilson’s March 1866 argument that the Civil Rights Bill as
originally drafted did not require common schools161 is indeed important
evidence that cuts the other way. But examining at the details suggests a
relatively easy way out. He was discussing an early draft of the bill that stated,
in terms very similar to those used to gloss the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, “There shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among
citizens of the United States in any State or Territory of the United States on

158. See id. at 1006, 1042–43. The Democratic argument that education was not a civil right
conflicted with their main argument that separation was not a relevant form of inequality, and so
it would be separate, but equal enough. If education is not a civil right, no sort of equality at all
regarding education was required. The Democratic concession that at least material equality in
schooling was required thus contradicted the argument that education was not a civil right.
159. Id. at 1014–15.
160. McConnell, supra note 24, at 986.
161. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866).
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account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery.”162 Wilson defended
this language, which was later removed, in this way:
This part of the bill will probably excite more opposition and elicit more
discussion than any other; and yet to my mind it seems perfectly defensible. It
provides for the equality of citizens of the United States in the enjoyment of
“civil rights and immunities.” What do these terms mean? Do they mean that
in all things civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race or
color, shall be equal? By no means can they be so construed. Do they mean
that all citizens shall vote in the several States? No; for suffrage is a political
right which has been left under the control of the several States, subject to the
action of Congress only when it becomes necessary to enforce the guarantee of
a republican form of government. Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit
on the juries, or that their children shall attend the same schools. These are not
civil rights or immunities. Well, what is the meaning? What are civil rights? I
understand civil rights to be simply the absolute rights of individuals, such
as—[Wilson here quotes Kent’s Commentaries]
“The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right
to acquire and enjoy property.” “Right itself, in civil society, is that which any
man is entitled to have, or to do, or to require from others, within the limits of
prescribed law.”
....
. . . [T]his bill, so far as it declares the equality of all citizens in the
enjoyment of civil rights and immunities, merely affirms existing law. . . . It is
not the object of this bill to establish new rights, but to protect and enforce
those which already belong to every citizen.163

Oddly enough, Wilson’s exposition of “civil rights and immunities” in 1866,
made in part to explain why it would not apply to schools, is strikingly similar
to the Republican senators’ expositions of “privileges and immunities” made in
1872 to explain why it would. The issue seems to be simply a question
whether Wilson or Sumner was right about the right to education as one that
“belong[s] to every citizen.” While he does not contemplate that education’s
status might change in the future, Wilson does not take it to be excluded from
“civil rights and immunities” as an analytic matter—that is, merely from the
meaning of the term. In a world, such as ours, where education is a right given
to all citizens, Wilson would seem able to agree that education would be a civil
right or immunity. Suppose Wilson were to come to agree with Sumner that
education was, like common carriers, “open to all,”164 or agree with
Representative Lynch, who thought that the desegregation bill “simply confers

162. Id.
163. Id. (citation omitted).
164. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1872).
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upon all citizens, or rather recognizes the right which has already been
conferred upon all citizens, to send their children to any public free school.”165
Notwithstanding Wilson’s exposition of the sense of “civil rights and
immunities,” even assuming the phrase is synonymous with “privileges and
immunities,” he could still agree that racial public-school segregation is
unconstitutional. Lynch’s “right which has already been conferred upon all
citizens and Wilson’s “rights . . . which already belong to every citizen” do not
represent a difference of opinion regarding the sense of their provisions, but a
difference of opinion regarding which rights, as a legal/sociological matter,
belong to every citizen. Combining Wilson’s sense with the actual facts,
Sumner’s conclusion is sound.
The silence during the immediate ratification period regarding
desegregation is not, of course, decisive under the Theory of Original Sinn.
Ratifiers obviously need not—indeed, they cannot—discuss, or even know,
every implication of the constitutional categories they are enacting. To be
sure, we might expect discussion of something that important, but the citizenry
had a lot of other important issues to discuss.
The segregation of D.C. schools is perhaps evidence that Congress
exercised its Dred Scott-denied power of “asserting principles inconsistent
with those on which they were acting.”166 But it is also important to remember
that: (a) the Privileges or Immunities Clause itself did not apply to Congress;
(b) Congress did not specifically re-enact a requirement of segregation during
the Republican control of Congress; and (c) supermajority filibuster
requirements prevented change in a Congress that included many opponents of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, as McConnell points out, there were
arguments made in February 1871 that desegregation of the D.C. schools was
required by the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.167 Speaking in favor of a
proposal by Sumner that would do just that, Senator Harris said: “We have
adopted the principle of equality in the Constitution of the United States, and I
think this is a proper place to enact a law in accordance therewith.”168 Sumner
criticized his colleagues who seemed consciously weak-willed.169 The
provision for the desegregation of the D.C. schools was, in line with the equalprivileges-based argument under the Fourteenth Amendment, “for the purpose
of assuring impartial and free school privileges to every child between the ages
of six and seventeen years, in the District of Columbia.”170

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

3 CONG. REC. 945 (1875).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1856).
See McConnell, supra note 24, at 977–80.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1055 (1871).
Id.
Id. at 1053.
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Likewise, Northern negrophobia is only dispositive if we make Chief
Justice Taney’s mistake. It only indicates weakness of will—or, to look at it
another way, strength of will to be able to assert such high constitutional
principles in the face of such a racist background culture.
I should also say something about the reasoning of the early courts that
ruled that segregated schools were constitutional. Their reasoning is scarce
and, particularly on whether enforced separation abridges the privileges of
citizens by imposing a stamp of inferiority, seems poorer than that of Sumner
and his Republican allies.
Roberts v. The City of Boston,171 from Massachusetts in 1850, briefly
rejected an earlier argument, also made by Charles Sumner, that separate
schools brand black people as inferior. While the state did have a
constitutional provision somewhat akin to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause barring “exclusive privileges” for particular men or associations,172 that
provision was not quoted by the court or considered in detail. The provision is
importantly different from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause, for it is far clearer that a segregationist brand of inferiority
abridges the privileges of black citizens than that it gives privileges to white
citizens. No particular association of people is able to exercise a privilege
under segregation.173 The court only briefly considered Sumner’s argument
that separate schools are a brand of inferiority.174 The Court, notably, did not

171. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).
172. The First Part, Art. VI of the Massachusetts Constitution provides: “No man . . . or
association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive
privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of
services rendered to the public . . . .” MASS. CONST. Part I, art. VI, reprinted in THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1890 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
173. Sumner, while he did refer to the provision in his argument, see Roberts, 59 Mass. (5
Cush.) at 201 (argument of counsel) (referring to “the spirit of American institutions, and
especially of the constitution of Massachusetts,” and citing Art. VI), asked the court to “declare
the by-law of the school committee, making a discrimination of color among children entitled to
the benefit of the public schools, to be unconstitutional and illegal, although there are no express
words of prohibition in the constitution and laws,” the method by which the court had earlier
abolished slavery. Id. at 203–04.
174. See id. at 209–10.
It is urged, that this maintenance of separate schools tends to deepen and perpetuate
the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in public opinion. This
prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and probably cannot be changed by law.
Whether this distinction and prejudice, existing in the opinion and feelings of the
community, would not be as effectually fostered by compelling colored and white
children to associate together in the same schools, may well be doubted; at all events, it is
a fair and proper question for the committee to consider and decide upon, having in view
the best interests of both classes of children placed under their superintendence, and we
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actually affirm that segregation was not a brand of inferiority, but only said
that it was a sufficiently difficult question that administrators should decide
it.175 Given the lack of any clear textual parallel to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause spurring the court to make a more careful analysis, the
decision is plainly not as persuasive as Sumner’s later argument textually
anchored in the Fourteenth Amendment.
State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann,176 from Ohio in 1872, relied first on an
anticipation of Slaughterhouse.177 The court also, however, argued that it
would reach the same conclusion even “conceding that the 14th amendment
not only provides equal securities for all, but guarantees equality of rights to
the citizens of a State, as one of the privileges of citizens of the United
States.”178 The court’s rationale for finding no violation of equality is brief.179
The court did not consider any argument that separation might be a brand of
inferiority, but simply assumed that both black and white students had, given
the equal proportion of the school fund, “equal school advantages.”180
Apparently, no argument from the Equal Protection Clause was raised, suitably
enough given the lack of post-Slaughterhouse expansion of the clause.181
State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy,182 from Nevada in 1872, actually struck
down on state grounds a statute that forbade integrated schools; the court
allowed state trustees the option of either separate or integrated schools.183
The court did offer a brief reference to the federal Constitution, but not to any

cannot say, that their decision upon it is not founded on just grounds of reason and
experience, and in the results of a discriminating and honest judgment.
Id.
175. Id. at 209.
176. 21 Ohio St. 198 (1872).
177. The court argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause “includes only such
privileges or immunities as are derived from, or recognized by, the constitution of the United
States.” Id. at 210.
178. Id.
179. See id. (“The law in question surely does not attempt to deprive colored persons of any
rights. On the contrary it recognizes their right, under the constitution of the State, to equal
common school advantages, and secures to them their equal proportion of the school fund. It
only regulates the mode and manner in which this right shall be enjoyed by all classes of
persons.”).
180. Id. at 211.
181. See McCann, 21 Ohio St. at 209 (stating that before the Fourteenth Amendment, “the
statutes classifying the youth of the State for school purposes on the basis of color, and the
decisions of this court in relation thereto, were not at all based on a denial that colored persons
were citizens, or that they were entitled to the equal protection of the laws. It would seem, then,
that these provisions of the amendment contain nothing conflicting with the statute authorizing
the classification . . . . Nor do we understand that the contrary is claimed by counsel in the case.
But the clause relied on, in behalf of the plaintiff,” is the Privileges and Immunities Clause)
182. 7 Nev. 342 (1872).
183. Id. at 347–48.
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of its language.184 The case’s dissent, which would have allowed the school
trustees to exclude black children entirely, adds a little bit more analysis in its
agreement on this point, relying on the claim that education was not a right of
citizens.185 The court’s statement in dicta that separate schools would be
allowed under the state constitution186 relied entirely on Massachusetts’s
Roberts and on a decision from Ohio in 1859, Van Camp v. Board of
Education of Logan,187 which had interpreted the meaning of “colored
children” in separate-schools legislation without subjecting that statute to any
constitutional scrutiny. The analysis of Duffy is too minimal to be persuasive
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, and because of its holding, the court
was not squarely faced with the constitutionality of segregation.
People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton,188 from a New York trial court in 1872,
relied on formal equality. Like Ohio’s McCann, the court anticipated
Slaughterhouse.189 The court then assumed without argument that “equal
common school advantages” were not imperiled by segregation.190 Like

184. See id. at 346, where the court said only this:
[R]elator replies, that such statute is opposed to the constitution and laws of the United
States; and to the constitution of the state of Nevada.
While it may be, and probably is, opposed to the spirit of the former, still it is not
obnoxious to their letter; and as no judicial action is more dangerous than that most
tempting and seductive practice of reading between the written lines, and interpolating a
spirit and intent other than that to be reached by ordinary and received rules of
construction or interpretation; such course will be declined, and reference at once had to
the constitution of this state.
185. See id. at 355 (Garber, J., dissenting).
I fully agree with my associates that this position of counsel [that the Fourteenth
Amendment bars segregated schools] is utterly untenable. The statute does not abridge
any privilege or immunity of the applicant, as a citizen of the United States. The privilege
of admission to the common schools of this state is no more inherent in or connected with
the status of citizenship than is the elective franchise; and to secure that against unfriendly
state legislation, an additional amendment was required and was proposed.
Id.
186. Id. at 348.
187. 9 Ohio St. 407 (1859).
188. 13 Abb. Pr. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
189. “There is some reason for believing that the privileges and immunities there referred to
are those only which arise under the Constitution of the United States, and not those which arise
under State laws.” Id. at 164.
190. See id. at 164–65.
[W]hat privilege of a citizen is abridged thereby? Certainly none, unless every citizen has
the privilege of choosing to which school, in a city, he will send his children. The relator
has equal common school advantages with other citizens. He does not assert that the
school which is open to him is not as good as the one which is closed. He does not
pretend that there is anything in its position, its pupils, or its teachers, which makes the
limitation of his children to that school a practical refusal to them of common school
advantages.
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McCann, the court simply did not consider whether a brand of racial inferiority
through separation was an abridgement of schooling privileges.
Ward v. Flood,191 from California in 1874, dismissed the Privileges and
Immunities Clause quickly and relied entirely on Roberts to reject a challenge
based on equal protection.192 After a long quotation from Roberts, the court
said simply, “We concur in these views, and they are decisive of the present
controversy.”193 Given the weakness of Roberts and Slaughterhouse as guides
to the Fourteenth Amendment, Ward is not compelling.
Cory v. Carter,194 from Indiana in 1874, relied heavily on Slaughterhouse,
quoting it for three pages.195 The court briefly dismissed equal protection,
which had not yet received any expansive interpretation in light of
Slaughterhouse, with a quotation from Ohio’s McCann, where the issue was
not raised.196
Bertonneau v. Board of Directors of City Schools,197 decided by Circuit
Judge (soon to be Justice) Woods in 1878, briefly dismissed a challenge to
segregation under the Equal Protection Clause. His reasoning did not consider
any sort of argument that a racial brand of inferiority abridges rights.198
Woods begged the question entirely about whether “equal school advantages”
Id.
191. 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
192. See id. at 53, where the key section of the opinion asserted:
It will be seen that the language of the Massachusetts Constitution prohibiting
“particular and exclusive privileges,” was fully as significant, to say the least, in its
bearing on the general question in hand as is that of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, securing “the equal protection of the laws.”
193. Id. at 56.
194. 48 Ind. 327 (1874).
195. See id. at 350–52.
196. Id. at 355 (“It would seem . . . that these provisions of the amendment contain nothing
conflicting with the statute authorizing the classification in question . . . . Nor do we understand
that the contrary is claimed by counsel . . . .”) (quoting State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio
St. 198, 209 (1871)).
197. 3 F. Cas. 294 (1878) (No. 1361).
198. See id. at 296, where Judge Woods said only:
Both races are treated precisely alike. White children and colored children are compelled
to attend different schools. That is all. The state, while conceding equal privileges and
advantages to both races, has the right to manage its schools in the manner which, in its
judgment, will best promote the interest of all.
The state may be of opinion that it is better to educate the sexes separately, and
therefore establishes schools in which the children of different sexes are educated apart.
By such a policy can it be said that the equal rights of either sex are invaded? Equality of
right does not involve the necessity of educating children of both sexes, or children
without regard to their attainments or age in the same school. Any classification which
preserves substantially equal school advantages does not impair any rights, and is not
prohibited by the constitution of the United States. Equality of rights does not necessarily
imply identity of rights.
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are given by a system that imposes a brand of racial inferiority by telling
blacks to keep away from whites. He did not consider Sumner’s compelling
argument to the contrary.
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher,199 from New York in 1883, relied on the
claim that separate schools themselves—that is, schools for black children—
are not likely to been seen as a disadvantage.200 The argument is very poor: it
is not the separate facilities themselves, but the exclusion from the general
facilities for other citizens, that is a badge of inferiority. The dissenters in
Gallagher are far more persuasive.201 The recognition by the Gallagher
dissenters of how the privileges of citizenship were impaired by segregation is
telling.
Lehew v. Brummell,202 from Missouri in 1891, assumed without argument,
like Gallagher and McCann, on which it relied, that no inequality of school
privileges was at stake in segregation.203 Like the courts in Gallagher and
McCann, the Missouri court did not consider the argument that being required
to receive an education under a badge of inferiority would abridge such a
privilege: “It is to be observed, in the first place, that these persons are not
denied the advantages of the public schools. The right to attend such schools,
and receive instruction thereat, is guarantied [sic] to them.”204 The court
199. 93 N.Y. 438 (1883).
200. See id. at 457.
It is not discrimination between the two races which is prohibited by law, but
discrimination against the interests of the colored race. We cannot conceive it to be
possible that it can be successfully maintained that in the establishment of schools,
asylums, hospitals and charitable institutions for the exclusive enjoyment of particular
races or classes, that the founders thereof are justly subject to the imputation of unfriendly
conduct toward the class for whom such institutions are designed.
Id.
201. See id. at 465–66 (Danforth, J., joined by Finch, J., dissenting).
[A]ny regulation by which the black is kept in a state of separation is in fact one of
exclusion and represents the sentiment by which the white assumed to be the superior
race, a discrimination against which the law is now directly aimed. . . .
....
In the case before us the city is under no obligation to maintain a separate school for
children of color. But the objection is not to its existence; the objection is that the relator
is compelled to attend it because of her color, and so is excluded from schools to which
children of another race are permitted to resort. The exaction is, therefore, unequal, and
is, I think, in violation of the law which gives to all children, within the several districts,
an equal right, in like cases and under like circumstances, to go to those schools for
education. I am, therefore, led to the conclusion that the relator, on account of her color,
has been prevented, by a public officer and by ordinance or regulation, from enjoying an
accommodation or privilege to which, as a citizen of this State, she is entitled.
Id.
202. 15 S.W. 765 (Mo. 1891).
203. Id. at 766–67.
204. Id. at 766.
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thought that the Massachusetts case from 1850, Roberts, had considered “a
constitutional provision similar to the fourteenth amendment.”205 As I explain
above, that assumption is not accurate.
In sum, there is virtually no serious consideration in these cases of whether
segregation impairs educational advantages by imparting a stamp of inferiority.
In the wake of Slaughterhouse, careful thinking about the privileges of
citizenship was short-circuited.
The Plessy majority, dealing with mandatory segregation in transportation
in 1896, did finally make an effort to rebut the charge that segregation imposes
a brand of inferiority, but their argument was quite poor. The Court said,
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been
more than once the case, and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race
should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and should enact a
law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to an
inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce
in this assumption. The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be
overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro
except by an enforced commingling of the two races.206

The Court argues that its members’ white racial pride would be enough to
withstand a segregationary insult, were the situation reversed. But the
hardiness of the victims’ self-confidence, notwithstanding the insult, does not
mean that there has been no insult. The existence of a racial brand of
inferiority does not depend on whether the victim race believes that it is
inferior. The fact that separation is a means by which the white majority
expresses its belief in black citizens’ inferiority is not changed by the fact that
the minority “would not acquiesce in this assumption.”207 If I am forced to
receive a tattoo on my forehead that says “Defective,” I have been branded as
inferior, whether I believe it or not. My failure to acquiesce in the assumption
that the brand is true is beside the point. Charles Black’s comment on this
“solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction on it”
argument is just right: “The curves of callousness and stupidity intersect at
their respective maxima.”208 Plessy’s second argument, doubting that “social
prejudices may be overcome by legislation,”209 is really somewhat bizarre as a
205. Id. at 767.
206. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
207. Id.
208. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
422 n.8 (1960).
209. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
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defense of a law that compelled the segregation of common carriers. The
contention that a legislative insult through segregation is an abridgement of
privileges does not assume in any way that, without such an insult, social
prejudices will disappear; the claim is only that such social prejudices may not
be expressed in legislation limiting civil rights.
Further, the reasoning of cases that strike down segregation on state
grounds is persuasive, insofar as it recognizes how the enforcement of a racial
brand of inferiority through separation operates to abridge the enjoyment of a
privilege. Indeed, it might be said that, after Slaughterhouse, cases interpreting
state provisions analogous to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but which
were not strangled in the crib, are a better guide to the proper interpretation of
the actual federal Privileges and Immunities Clause than are cases considering
federal challenges under the Equal Protection Clause, pressed into textually
awkward service to fill the privileges-and-immunities void, or cases that follow
Slaughterhouse’s mistake.
Clark v. Board of Directors,210 from Iowa in 1868, considered a
constitutional requirement that the school board “provide for the education of
all the youths of the State, through a system of common schools.”211 The court
compared race to nationality.212 “Equal privileges” was the key category
which segregation violated, making the case persuasive regarding the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.213
People ex rel. Workman v. Board of Education of Detroit,214 from
Michigan in 1869, held that a statutory requirement that “[a]ll residents of any
district shall have an equal right to attend any school therein”215 prohibited

210. 24 Iowa 266 (1868).
211. Id. at 271.
212. See id. at 276.
Our statute does not, either in letter or in spirit, recognize or justify any such distinction or
limitations of right or privilege on account of nationality. For the courts to sustain a board
of school directors or other subordinate board or officer in limiting the rights and
privileges of persons by reason of their nationality, would be to sanction a plain violation
of the spirit of our laws not only, but would tend to perpetuate the national differences of
our people and stimulate a constant strife, if not a war of races.
Id.
213. See id.
Our statute has expressed the sovereign will, that all the youths of the State between
the ages of five and twenty-one years shall be entitled to all the privileges and benefits of
our common schools, and it is not competent for the board of directors to resist that
sovereign will and declare, that, since “public sentiment in their district is opposed to the
intermingling of the white and colored children in the same school,” they will deny equal
privileges to some of the youths.
Id.
214. 18 Mich. 400 (1869).
215. Id. at 409.
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segregation.216 The court saw that “equal rights”—the same concept
underlying the Privileges and Immunities Clause—forbade segregation.
Board of Education of Ottawa v. Tinnon,217 from Kansas in 1881, relied on
the United States Supreme Court’s 1873 Railroad Co. v. Brown in recognizing
that segregation would violate a requirement for schools “free to all children
residing in such city.”218 The court argued, “[I]f only one school out of all the
schools of a city of the second class is free for colored children to attend, is
that maintaining common schools, free to all the children of the city?”219 The
court followed Iowa’s Clark in striking down segregation on state grounds, and
suggested that Strauder was inconsistent with the cases finding segregation
constitutional under federal law.220
Chase v. Stephenson,221 from Illinois in 1874, held that local authorities
lacked the power to segregate public schools, which were to be open to
everyone. While the court cited no authorities, its reasoning suggests that
segregation would be a denial of equal civil rights.222 In 1882, the court
clarified Chase in People ex rel. Longress v. Board of Education of Quincy.223
It adhered to its views in Chase and gave a fuller explanation, noting that given
a statute under which districts were “prohibited from excluding, directly or
indirectly, any such child from school on account of the color of such child,”224
segregation was prohibited. The court’s rationale fits well with the pre216. Justice Cooley, one of the top constitutional scholars of the century, wrote for the Court,
It cannot be seriously urged that with this provision in force, the school board of any
district which is subject to it may make regulations which would exclude any resident of
the district from any of its schools, because of race or color, or religious belief, or
personal peculiarities. It is too plain for argument that an equal right to all the schools,
irrespective of all such distinctions, was meant to be established.
Id. at 409–10.
217. 26 Kan. 1 (1881).
218. Id. at 20.
219. Id. at 20. The Court added, “[U]nder [Railroad Co. v. Brown], railroad cars are not free
to a person who is excluded from all but one of them; and, on the same principle, schools are not
free to a person who is excluded from all but one of them.” Id. at 21.
220. See id. at 23.
221. 71 Ill. 383 (1874).
222. See id. at 385.
The free schools of the State are public institutions, and in their management and
control the law contemplates that they should be so managed that all children within the
district, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, regardless of race or color, shall
have equal and the same right to participate in the benefits to be derived therefrom.
While the directors, very properly, have large and discretionary powers in regard to
the management and control of schools, in order to increase their usefulness, they have no
power to make class distinctions, neither can they discriminate between scholars on
account of their color, race or social position.
Id.
223. 101 Ill. 308 (1882).
224. Id. at 314.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

ORIGINALISM AND THE SENSE–REFERENCE DISTINCTION

617

Slaughterhouse equality-of-citizenship argument against segregation.225 As in
Railroad Co. v. Brown, “exclusion” encompassed segregation, supporting the
conclusion that “abridgement” would as well.
Finally, Commonwealth v. Davis,226 from a Pennsylvania trial court in
1881, is also very interesting in holding, relying on the Slaughterhouse
dissents,227 that the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires desegregation.
Legislative desegregation mooted any appeal, but the court’s reasoning fits
well with the Republican pre-Slaughterhouse argument.228 The court offered a
creative argument that education is included within “property,”229 and
225. See id. at 314–15.
Under the amendment of the constitution of the United States, persons of color are
citizens of the United States, and of the State where they may reside. Being citizens of the
State, upon an equality with other citizens, there can be no doubt in regard to the power of
the legislature to provide that no discrimination shall be made on account of color by
boards of education who have the management and control of our free schools. . . . Under
the rules adopted, these colored children are excluded from the public schools in the
district where they reside, and are all required to attend a school composed exclusively of
colored children, known as the Lincoln school. Under the operation of these rules a
colored child cannot attend the school in the district where such child resides, on account
of its color, but is compelled to travel perhaps several miles to a distant part of the city to
a colored school. This is a direct violation of the statute, which says the board is
prohibited from excluding, directly or indirectly, any such child from such school on
account of color.
Id.
226. 10 Weekly Notes of Cases Pa.C. 156 (Crawford County C.P. 1881).
227. Id. at 158 (relying on Justice Swayne’s Slaughterhouse dissent, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
124 (1872)).
228. See id.
The “privileges and immunities” of a citizen of the United States include among
other things the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, and also the rights which
pertain to him by reason of his membership in the Union, among which may be included
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety, subject only to such restraints as the government may provide for
the general good of the whole. . . . A citizen of the United States is not bound to cringe to
any superior, or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.
Id.
229. See id. at 159.
The privileges and immunities therefore, of every citizen of the United States which
are prohibited by the XIVth Amendment from being abridged by the State, I have shown
to include the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, with the right to acquire
and possess the same freely and equally. This property is everything which has an
exchangeable value, and the right of property includes the power to dispose of it
according to the will of the owner. Labor is property; education is property. It is entitled
to protection without abridgement. The right to make this species of property available is
next in importance to the right of life and liberty. It lies to a large extent at the foundation
of most other forms of property and of all solid individual and national prosperity.
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

618

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:555

suggested that segregation comes close to violating even the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition on involuntary servitude.230 As “involving . . . the
very personification of caste,”231 segregation was an insulting badge of
inferiority.232 In short, while it may betray a dangerous degree of state-court
independence from the Supreme Court, Davis suggests additional strength,
even post-Slaughterhouse, in the view that segregation abridges a privilege of
citizens by imposing a brand of inferiority in the civic realm.
D. McConnell’s Theoretical Commitments
In stressing the apparent superiority of the reasoning of Sumner and his
allies, and depending on McConnell’s important historical research, I have a
few important quibbles with McConnell’s theoretical approach. He notes,
As an initial matter, it is clear beyond peradventure that a very substantial
portion of the Congress, including leading framers of the Amendment,
subscribed to the view that school segregation violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. At a minimum, therefore, the scholarly consensus must be
corrected to admit that this interpretation is within the legitimate range of
interpretations of the Amendment on originalist grounds. But is it possible to
say more: that this interpretation was the prevailing, or preponderant, view,
and thus the best understanding of the original meaning?233

230. See id. at 160.
[W]hen a law makes a discrimination between classes of persons, and one which deprives
the one class of their freedom or their property (in the sense I have heretofore used the
word property) or which makes a caste of them to subserve the pride or vanity of others,
or which deprives one citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens, it would
seem to be an encroachment of his liberty, and a badge of servitude which is prohibited by
the Constitution.
Id.
231. Davis, 10 Weekly Notes of Cases Pa.C. at 160.
232. See id.
I can see nothing destructive to our institutions in the demolition of the legal barriers that
have been erected so long and so high between the colored race, and their natural, civil,
and political rights and liberties.
The white race owes the colored race at least fair play in their great struggle for
education and improvement and advancement, which they are making, and have a right to
make in their recently emancipated condition.
If, after being accorded equal advantages and freedom from petty tyranny and
studied insult, and the incentive to self-respect which is meted to others, the colored man
then falls behind in the great race for human progress, it will then be time to talk of the
moral and intellectual inferiority of his race. Nothing but gross uncharitableness can be
jealous or envious of advancement and progress founded upon true merit.
Id.
233. McConnell, supra note 24, at 1093 (footnote omitted).
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McConnell says that he is searching for the “prevailing, or preponderant, view,
and thus the best understanding of the original meaning,”234 and conducts
extensive analyses of the votes to verify that, among congressional supporters
of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is indeed good reason to think that a
desegregationary intent was more prevalent. But the Theory of Original Sinn
would not see prevailing assessments of reference as necessarily correct. The
central examples I used to motivate the theory assume that all the Framers can
be wrong about the constitutional referent, because they can all be wrong about
the facts. It is obviously more important that Sumner’s reasoning regarding the
manner in which the social meaning of segregation abridges civil rights, and
therefore violates the Fourteenth Amendment, is persuasive than that it was
widely accepted. Of course, wide acceptance is probative of persuasiveness,
but not dispositive. Citing dissents is not, other things being equal, as good as
citing majority opinions, but depending on the case, it can be the right thing to
do.
Also, McConnell at one point suggests (albeit mildly, through his reliance
on another’s arguments) that a Berger-style “What Would the Framers Do?”
question is the critical one. McConnell relies on an article by Robert Lipkin
for the idea that “abstract values, as opposed to concrete intentions, are a
problematic basis for originalism.”235 Lipkin’s argument in the footnote on
which McConnell relies asserts that “originalism is essentially an historicist
methodology. It asks what the actual historical actors would choose.”236 But
this is Berger’s WWFD approach, and is thus subject to fatal criticism in cases
where the Framers are ignorant or wrong about critical factual questions.
Indeed, it is an approach that McConnell himself earlier criticized
compellingly, if briefly, in condemning “those who interpret the Constitution
as if it froze into place the conclusions reached at the time of the framing about
the application of constitutional principles to concrete situations.”237
McConnell’s new preference for the concrete is unfortunate. The sense
expressed by the text is always, to the extent that it relies on facts to produce
reference, more or less “abstract.” Unless the text employs a name or other
device for directly picking out a referent without relying on some sort of
factual property of the referent, there is no avoiding a degree of abstraction in
interpretation. We must supplement the historically extracted sense with the
actual facts, not necessarily the facts as the Framers saw them. If this is not
“originalism,” so be it.
McConnell insists stoutly, and properly, on distinguishing results that
might have been preferred on policy grounds from those that were the result of

234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 952 n.14 (citing Robert Justin Lipkin, supra note 70, at 829 n. 67).
Lipkin, supra note 70, at 829 n.67.
McConnell, supra note 36, at 361–62.
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constitutional interpretation. But he would do well to distinguish results that
were the result of proper constitutional interpretation, and a proper assessment
of the reference-yielding facts, from those that might not have been. The
Theory of Original Sinn requires no attachment to predominant opinions being
correct. With such a standard, the Theory of Original Sinn will thus have, in
one way, an easier time than McConnell of showing the consistency of Brown
with its brand of originalism.
It is not necessary that our view about the reference-yielding facts be
preponderant or prevailing among the Founders, and it is also not sufficient.
McConnell’s work showing the prevalence of Sumner’s views is therefore, as
well as not strictly being required, not enough. Preponderant error is possible.
Also, an emphasis on the reasoning involved will cause problems for some of
the evidence that McConnell marshals, because it is based in part on the votes
in Congress, and accompanying constitutional interpretation, which are
themselves based on a post-Slaughterhouse shift to the Equal Protection
Clause. Shifting grounds in this way is understandable, but it undermines the
Republicans’ textual argument. McConnell dismisses one criticism by Earl
Maltz by saying that it “is significant not to whether school segregation was
understood as unconstitutional, but to the nice question of which Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the source of that constitutional principle.”238 He
notes that he “treated the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the dominant and
most plausible source of constitutional authority prior to Slaughterhouse, and
assumed that the shift to equal protection after Slaughterhouse was simply a
tactical response to that decision.”239 Such a tactical response, recognized as
such, is not persuasive evidence of the correct interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause. McConnell argues that the distinction between the theories
“is of theoretical interest to those who are concerned about the relation
between the three substantive Clauses of Section One as originally understood,
but it does not affect the originalist case for Brown.”240 Because the
Republicans’ textual argument is critical to their reasoning, however, the
relation between the clauses is essential to an evaluation of their position under
the Theory of Original Sinn, whether or not it would be important to “the
originalist case for Brown.”
Likewise, Strauder and Harlan’s Plessy dissent deploy a rhetoric of the
rights of citizens to which they are not really entitled, unless they mean to undo
the Slaughterhouse mistake. Only a resurrected Privileges and Immunities
Clause—not merely its ghost—can give proper support to the Republican
arguments against the constitutionality of school segregation. Given the

238. Michael W. McConnell, Segregation and the Original Understanding: A Reply to
Professor Maltz, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 233, 240 (1996).
239. Id.
240. Id.
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number of scholars advocating the reversal of Slaughterhouse, however, this
seems by no means a fatal problem.
E.

Rubenfeld on Brown

In arguing for Brown, Rubenfeld claims in chapter ten of Freedom and
Time that he can show why it is “an easy case” under his method.241 Tellingly,
Rubenfeld nowhere in this chapter quotes or reasons from the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but begins with the foundational forbidden paradigm
This paradigm case was recognized in
case, the black codes.242
243
Slaughterhouse,
then expanded in Strauder.244
Rubenfeld applauds
Strauder’s formulation quoted at greater length above—“legal discriminations,
implying inferiority in civil society”245—as the proper result of later
interpreters’ inventing categories to cover the paradigm case. He then
applauds Brown v. Board of Education’s argument that segregation is
unconstitutional because it “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way likely ever to
be undone,” which Rubenfeld takes to be a proper expansion of Strauder’s
“inferiority in civil society.”246 Judges need only “formulate something like an
anti-inferiorization or anti-caste principle for the equal protection clause” and
then find that principle violated because “racial separation laws were
untouchability laws.”247
I agree that an anti-inferiorization or anti-caste principle is what we need in
order to legitimize Brown, but I disagree sharply with Rubenfeld about where
we should get it. I think, in line with Sumner’s argument above, that we
should derive such a principle from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
originally understood. We cannot merely “formulate” one out of our own
materials. Rubenfeld mentions his desire to “do justice to the text in light of its
paradigm cases,”248 but he does not mention the actual text at all. His method
seems better described as “doing justice, in addition to the paradigm cases.”
The actual text of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the textual concept of
privileges and immunities of citizens, do not do any actual work for Rubenfeld.
We start with the paradigm cases and then add some principles that seem right.
He concedes that “the interpretive task called for by the paradigm case
method—the task of extrapolating principles from paradigm cases and
241. RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 22, at 180.
242. Id. at 182.
243. Id. at 191.
244. Id.
245. Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307–08 (1879)).
246. RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 21, at 192.
247. Id. at 193.
248. Id. at 194; see also id. at 190 (“Paradigm case interpretation is the effort to do justice to a
text in light of its paradigm cases.”).
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applying those principles to new facts—irreducibly requires the exercise of
judicial, normative, evaluative judgment.”249 The idea seems to be that we, as
interpreters, have our own norms and values, and we use them to produce the
principles. Our interpretations are only as good as our own character on which
we draw to produce those principles. But if that is right, what is the normative
external constraint on interpretation? A normative support for Brown should
explain why it is right, and why the intermediate principles it uses are right. If
our interpretive method has, itself, an irreducibly normative element, merely in
virtue of the fact that we are interpreting a constitution, then we risk a sort of
circular reasoning in explaining why Brown is a good decision. The reasoning
would seem to go like this: (a) Brown is a good idea, because (b) Brown is the
best interpretation of the Constitution, because (c) Brown is a good idea. The
Theory of Original Sinn, though, can supply a reason why intermediate
principles are right, using the sense of the text as originally understood and
arguments such as Sumner’s that use that text. But Rubenfeld, insisting on the
freedom of later interpreters, cannot. He properly relies on intermediate
principles like the anti-caste principle as enunciated in Strauder v. West
Virginia and Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, but disavows any reliance on
textual justification for those principles.
Consider one simple example of an alternative principle that could cover
paradigm cases just as well. We can cover 1868’s paradigm cases of the
Fourteenth Amendment just as well if we limit our principles to situations that
exist before, say, 1940. That is, we might say that the Fourteenth Amendment
has a sunset provision at some point in the future. We might reason that
constitutional provisions really ought to be able to get into the hearts and
minds of legislators within seventy years or so, and that if a constitutional
provision is still being violated after all that time, there’s no point in striking
legislation down. Such a principle will do just as well in capturing the
original, motivating paradigm cases, so such a principle cannot be wrong
because it fails to cover the paradigm cases. The motivating paradigm cases,
of course, all existed in 1868. Textualism gives a simple reason why a sunset
principle is wrong: there just isn’t a sunset provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment. If the text does not have a sunset provision, our principles cannot
include one. But on Rubenfeld’s approach, I cannot see what would keep such
principles out, if not the text. And the anathemas that Rubenfeld pronounces
against any form of textualism prevent him from utilizing this method himself.
Rubenfeld can argue, of course, that a sunset provision is, substantively, a
bad idea. Those doing paradigm-case reasoning should only use good
principles that can also cover the paradigm case. But surely whether a
constitutional provision has a sunset provision should not turn on whether
present interpreters think such a provision would be a good idea. There must
249. Id. at 194–95.
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therefore be more to justify an intermediate constitutional principle than (a)
intrinsic desirability, and (b) ability to cover the paradigm cases. The text has
always been the standard source for such justification in constitutional
interpretation, and Rubenfeld gives no good explanation why we should either
turn to some different source or do without one entirely.
Rubenfeld lacks what the Theory of Original Sinn supplies: a reason why
we should pick one set of intermediate principles over another. The Theory of
Original Sinn requires that we should pick those intermediate principles that
either (a) correctly restate the original constitutional sense, or (b) correctly
combine the original constitutional sense with the actual facts about the world.
We should prefer an anti-caste principle to the extent that it follows from the
sense of the Fourteenth Amendment: for instance, if it can truly be said that a
law enforcing caste would “abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States.” In order to make that determination, we must attach
particular meanings to such words as “abridge” and “privileges or
immunities”—we cannot merely jump from the paradigm cases to an
intermediate principle that seems good to us. Rubenfeld, though, does not
want to consider how the constitutional language was understood, but only
wants to consider the paradigm cases. Just as we require of the Framers that
they give a textual reason why they support the intermediate constitutional
principles and ultimate constitutional conclusions so that we can evaluate those
reasons, we must ourselves have a better reason for our own intermediate
principles and conclusions than their intrinsic attractiveness to us. Rubenfeld
simply asserts his preference for the principles that he likes, and which would
support Brown. But the Theory of Original Sinn offers the materials for a
reason why those principles are good ones as an interpretive matter. Because
the Theory of Original Sinn avoids resting constitutional interpretation on the
mere ipse dixit of later interpreters, it is a better candidate for offering an actual
normative defense of Brown, rather than a pledge of adherence to it.
As I noted above, the rules of Strauder and Harlan’s Plessy dissent use the
language and argumentation pertaining to equality of the privileges of
citizenship in a way that lacks good textual warrant if Slaughterhouse remains
governing law. Overturning Slaughterhouse in the name of the original sense
of the Fourteenth Amendment therefore allows these arguments to have a
much sounder normative basis in the constitutional text.
Rubenfeld argues that the paradigm-case method makes better sense of the
post-Brown desegregation cases than can a theory that says that the Framers
were wrong because they did not know that education would become a civil
right.250 But we can disagree with earlier interpreters, not merely on whether
250. Id. at 192 (“Particularly irrelevant is the claim made by Brown’s supporters that
education had become a thing of newly fundamental civil importance by 1954—a thought that, if
it does some good for Brown, fails utterly to explain the numerous decisions that followed close
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education was a civil right, but on whether the segregationary stamp of
inferiority abridges the rights characteristically enjoyed by citizens. Sumner’s
arguments regarding common carriers are easily adequate to explain buses,
golf courses, public beaches, and bathhouses. Miscegenation is a larger topic,
but can be handled along the same lines: as McConnell points out, none of the
Republican supporters of desegregation denied that their constitutional theory
would invalidate miscegenation laws as well.251
F.

Fallon on Brown

Fallon argues that the failure of originalist arguments to support Brown
should give support to Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading of the Constitution,
which has an affinity with Fallon’s fifth mode of constitutional
interpretation.252 Fallon relies on much the same evidence that Raoul Berger
does, writing that “those who wrote and ratified the relevant provisions
apparently did not understand them to forbid school segregation.”253 This
statement may be true, but as discussed above, it is not dispositive under the
Theory of Original Sinn: lack of an understanding of a particular referent does
not entail the lack of a grasp of a sense which, when combined with the actual
facts, produces that referent. Note as well that not understanding a provision to
forbid segregation is distinct from understanding the provision not to forbid
segregation. Charles Black stresses this point: “In [Bickel’s] data I find, to be
sure, a case for concluding that the relevant people did not ‘intend’ to abolish
on the heels of Brown in which the Court tore down America’s racial separation regime in all its
de jure forms, from segregated golf courses to public beaches.”) (footnotes omitted). Rubenfeld
cites Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (dealing with buses), Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350
U.S. 879 (1955) (dealing with golf courses), Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(dealing with public beaches and bathhouses), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (dealing
with interracial marriage). RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 21, at 192–93 n.21.
251. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 1018 (“[I]t is striking that not a single supporter of the
1875 Act attempted to deny that under their interpretation, anti-miscegenation laws were
unconstitutional.”).
252. See supra text accompanying note 94.
253. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 1. Fallon’s evidence for
this assertion is much the same as that evidence adduced by Berger:
This is certainly the consensus view among legal historians, who note, among other
things, that when the Equal Protection Clause was ratified in 1868, five northern states
excluded black children completely from public education, while an additional eight states
permitted segregated schools. There was little or no evidence in the surrounding
legislative history that either Congress in proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, or the
states in ratifying it, meant to force a change in this practice. On the contrary, the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended largely to constitutionalize the 1866 Civil Rights
Act, and the principal sponsors of that Act specifically denied that it would force the
integration of public education. Indeed, the Reconstruction Congress that proposed the
Fourteenth Amendment maintained segregation in the District of Columbia schools.
Id. at 139 n.7 (citations omitted).
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segregation, in the sense that they had no positive and consciously formed
intention of doing so. That conclusion means little when one is dealing with
general language.”254 Black distinguishes what he thought was not shown:
“[A] definitely formed intent to exclude segregation from the prohibitive ambit
of the amendment’s general words—a totally different meaning of the
predicate ‘did not intend.’”255
Fallon moves, however, from this more limited claim to a much more
expansive dismissal of originalism on the basis of Brown. Fallon restates his
position, “The Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment apparently
had no specific intent to abolish school segregation, which flourished as much
after the ratification of the [Fourteenth Amendment] as it had before.”256 From
this lack of a specific intent, however—that is, the lack of an original
understanding of the reference of the Fourteenth Amendment’s expressions to
include desegregation—Fallon moves immediately to dismiss, on the basis of
Brown, any binding force for the original understanding, even the original
understanding of the sense of the constitutional language. Fallon writes:
If viewed as a “paradigm” of appropriate Supreme Court decision making,
Brown v. Board of Education teaches [that] . . . . under widely accepted norms
of interpretive practice, the Supreme Court simply is not bound in every case
by a narrow conception of the framers’ intent or the original understanding of
constitutional language. Original understandings provide an important
reference point for the assessment of constitutional meaning, but need not
always prove decisive. Within limits, the Court is entitled to provide what
Professor Dworkin calls a “moral reading” of the Constitution.257

Fallon overlooks the possibility that I embrace: that the “original
understanding of constitutional language”—that is, the original understanding
of the sense of constitutional language—might be binding even where the
“narrow conception of the Framers’ intent”—that is, the original beliefs about
the referent of constitutional language—is not. He moves too quickly to
embrace moral theorizing as the only means whereby we might correct the
Framers, neglecting the possibility that we might disagree with the Framers,
not on moral questions, but simply on the reference-yielding facts. Indeed, we
need not even disagree with the Framers on the reference-yielding facts, but

254. Black, supra note 208, at 423 n.14.
255. Id.
256. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 57. Parenthetically, as
McConnell documents, there was a significant movement for desegregation in the North after the
Fourteenth Amendment, and some of this movement specifically invoked it. See McConnell,
supra note 24, at 971–77; id. at 977 (“As the implications of the new constitutional regime came
to be more fully understood in the North, segregation eventually was prohibited, either by
legislative or judicial action, in every state.”).
257. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 58 (footnote omitted).
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might simply know more than they do; their ignorance of a constitutional
referent is obviously not dispositive, whether we take a moral reading or not.
The Theory of Original Sinn does not deny that, if the Constitution
contains moral terminology, then moral theorizing would be needed in order to
figure out the Constitutional referent. For instance, the Fifth Amendment
refers to “just compensation.”258 Without a theory of the remedial justice
pertaining to compensation, we cannot interpret this expression: if “just”
expresses a moral evaluation, then finding out the facts about “just
compensation” will require determining the substance of moral reality.
Sometimes, it does seem that the Constitution allows moral reality to shape its
tangible results. To know the referent of an expression using terms like
“population,” interpreters must learn the facts about population. Likewise, to
know the proper referent of an expression including moral terms like “just,”
later interpreters have no choice but to assess the moral facts about justice.
However, I see little compelling grounds to think that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s language expresses moral concepts. “The privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States” seems to refer to legal rights, not
moral ones: to discover them, we are to conduct a legal and sociological study
of the privileges and immunities that have characterized citizenship in the
United States, not a moral study of the rights that people ought to have. There
seems little warrant for thinking, as Fallon and Dworkin would, that they have
particularly moral content. Consider the Republican view of the clause in
1872. The moral reading is not evident. Senator Sumner, while he cited the
Declaration of Independence and a large variety of other documents in order to
argue for the proposition that citizens should have equal rights and in arguing
that his bill was a good idea, his exposition of the substance of the rights of
citizens looks to a careful examination of the common law and the rights that
generally characterize citizenship, not moral philosophy. He wanted equality
in privileges “created or regulated by law.” Senator Sherman, quoted above, is
most explicit in claiming that knowing the privileges of citizens requires a
careful examination of the common law and other customary rights of citizens.
There is no theoretical per se bar to a moral reading of a morally expressed
provision. A constitution-writer could easily say, “No State shall make or
enforce unjust laws,” and to find out the reference of the expression “unjust
laws,” we would need to know the facts about justice.259 But the Fourteenth
Amendment’s language does not seem to be moral language.
That said, our moral outrage at racial segregation is not interpretively
irrelevant: we are from the same political tradition that produced Charles
Sumner, and his outrage and ours may well have a common root and find
258. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
259. Such a provision would not be a terribly sensible one, I think, especially if it were
judicially enforceable. But it is imaginable.
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common expression in the Fourteenth Amendment. Given our moral opinions
about segregation, to the extent that they are the moral opinions likely to be
held by sensible people and to follow from sensible principles, and to the
extent that the Framers, too, were sensible people and enacted sensible
principles, we have some reason to think that the Framers would have enacted
a principle from which our conclusions about segregation follow.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Theory of Original Sinn puts an emphasis on the text of the
Constitution as historically understood that is in line with the Supreme Court’s
historical approach and with the intuitive idea that office-holders swear to obey
historically embedded constitutional language (“this Constitution”) as the
supreme law of the land. The theory that the original sense, but not the
original reference, is interpretively binding makes better sense of the possible
phenomena of Framer ignorance and error than do other theories that either
privilege reference, like Berger’s or Rubenfeld’s theories, or that impose
excessively complicated and rigid rules, like Fallon’s theory. It offers a more
successful way to give normative support to the desegregation decision in
Brown than can these other theories.
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